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1. INTRODUCTION
We present formal specifications of various aspects of the π-calculus, including its
syntax, operational semantics, bisimulation relations, and modal logics. We shall
do this by using the FOλ∆∇ logic [Miller and Tiu 2005]. We provide a high-level
introduction to this logic here before presenting more technical aspects of it in the
next section.
Just as it is common to use meta-level application to represent object-level ap-
plication (for example, the encoding of P + Q is via the meta-level application of
the encoding for plus to the encoding of its two arguments), we shall use meta-level
λ-abstractions to encode object-level abstractions. The term higher-order abstract
syntax (HOAS) [Pfenning and Elliott 1988] is commonly used to describe this ap-
proach to mapping object-level abstractions into some meta-level abstractions. Of
course, the nature of the resulting encodings varies as one varies the meta-level.
For example, if the meta-level is a higher-order functional programming language
or a higher-order type theory, the usual abstraction available constructs function
spaces. In this case, HOAS maps object-level abstractions to semantically rich
function spaces: determining whether or not two syntactic objects are equal is then
mapped to the question of determining if two functions are equal (typically, an un-
decidable judgment). In such a setting, HOAS is less about syntax and more about
a particular mathematical denotation of the syntax. In this paper, we start with
an intuitionistic subset of the Simple Theory of Types [Church 1940] that does not
contain the mathematical axioms of extensionality, description, choice, and infinity.
In this setting, λ-abstraction is not strong enough to denote general computable
functions and equality of λ-terms is decidable. As a result, this weaker logic pro-
vides term-level bindings that can be used to encode syntax with bindings. This
style of describing syntax via a meta-logic containing a weak form of λ-abstraction
has been called the λ-tree syntax [Miller 2000] approach to HOAS in order to distin-
guish it from the approaches that use function spaces. The λ-tree syntax approach
to encoding expressions is an old one (cf. [Huet and Lang 1978; Miller and Na-
dathur 1986; 1987; Paulson 1986]) and is used in specifications written in the logic
programming languages λProlog [Nadathur and Miller 1988] and Twelf [Pfenning
and Schu¨rmann 1999].
Following Church, we shall use λ-abstractions to encode both term-level abstrac-
tions and formula-level abstractions (e.g., quantifiers). The computational aspects
of the π-calculus are usually specified via structured operational semantics [Plotkin
1981]: here, such specifications are encoded directly as inference rules and proofs
over primitive relational judgments (e.g., one-step transitions). As a result, a formal
account of the interaction of binding in syntax and binding in computation leads to
notions of proof-level abstractions. One such binding is the familiar eigenvariable
abstraction of [Gentzen 1969] used to encode a universally quantified variable that
has scope over an entire sequent. A second proof-level binding was introduced in
[Miller and Tiu 2005] to capture a notion of generic judgment: this proof-level bind-
ing has a scope over individual entries within a sequent and is closely associated
with the formula-level binding introduced by the ∇-quantifier. A major goal of this
paper is to illustrate how the ∇-quantifier and this second proof-level abstraction
can be used to specify and reason about computation: the π-calculus has been
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chosen, in part, because it is a small calculus in which bindings play an important
role in computation.
A reading of the truth condition for ∇xγ .Bx is something like the following: this
formula is true if Bx is true for the new element x of type γ. In particular, the
formula ∇xγ∇yγ .x 6= y is a theorem regardless of the intended interpretation of
the domain γ since the bindings for x and y are distinct. In contrast, the truth
value of the formula ∀xγ∀yγ .x 6= y is dependent on the domain γ: this quantified
inequality is true if and only if the interpretation of γ is empty.
The FOλ∆∇ logic is based on intuitionistic logic, a weaker logic than classical
logic. One of the principles missing from intuitionistic logic is that of the excluded
middle: that is, A ∨ ¬A is not generally provable in intuitionistic logic. Consider,
for example, the following formula concerning the variable w:
∀xγ [x = w ∨ x 6= w]. (∗)
In classical logic, this formula is a trivial theorem. From a constructive point-of-
view, it might not be desirable to admit this formula as a theorem in some cases.
If the type of quantification γ is a conventional (closed) first-order datatype, then
we might expect to have a decision procedure for equality. For example, if γ is
the type for lists, then it is a simple matter to construct a procedure that decides
whether or not two members of γ are equal by considering the top constructor of
the list and, in the event of comparing two non-empty lists, making a recursive call
(assuming a decision procedure is available for the elements of the list). In fact,
it is possible to prove in an intuitionistic logic augmented with induction (see, for
example, [Tiu 2004]) the formula (∗) for closed, first-order datatypes.
If the type γ is not given inductively, as is the usual case for names in intu-
itionistic formalizations of the π-calculus (see [Despeyroux 2000] and below), then
the corresponding instance of (∗) is not provable. Thus, whether or not we allow
instances of (∗) to be assumed can change the nature of a specification. In fact, we
show in Section 5, that if we add to our specification of open bisimulation [Sangiorgi
1996] assumptions corresponding to (∗), then we get a specification of late bisimu-
lation. If we were working with a classical logic, such a declarative presentation of
these two bisimulations would not be so easy to describe.
The authors first presented the logic used in this paper in [Miller and Tiu 2003]
and illustrated its usefulness with the π-calculus: in particular, the specifications of
one-step transitions in Figure 2 and of late bisimulation in Figure 3 also appear in
[Miller and Tiu 2003] but without proof. In this paper, we state the formal prop-
erties of our specifications, provide a specification of late bisimulation, and provide
a novel comparison between open and late bisimulation. In particular, we show
that the difference between open and late bisimulation (apart from the difference
that arises from the use of types defined inductively or not) can be captured by the
different quantification of free names using ∀ and ∇. We show in Section 5 that a
natural class of name distinctions can be captured by the alternation of ∀ and ∇
quantifiers and, in the case where we are interested only in checking open bisim-
ilarity modulo the empty distinction, the notion of distinction that arises in the
process of checking bisimilarity is completely subsumed by quantifier alternation.
In Section 6 we show that “modal logics for mobility” can easily be handled as
well and present, for the first time, a modal characterization of open bisimulation.
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Since our focus in this paper is on names, scoping of names, dependency of names,
and distinction of names, we have chosen to focus on the finite π-calculus. The
treatment of the π-calculus with replication is presented in Section 7 through an
example. In Section 8 we outline the automation of proof search based on these
specifications: when such automation is applied to our specification of open bisim-
ulation, a symbolic bisimulation procedures arises. In Section 9 we present some
related and future work and Section 10 concludes the paper. In order to improve
the readability of the main part of the paper, numerous technical proofs have been
moved to the appendices.
Parts of this paper, in their preliminary forms and without proofs, have been
presented in [Tiu and Miller 2004; Tiu 2005]: in particular, the material on encoding
bisimulations (Section 5) corresponds to [Tiu and Miller 2004] and the material on
encoding modal logics for the π-calculus (Section 6) corresponds to [Tiu 2005].
2. OVERVIEW OF THE LOGIC
This paper is about the use of a certain logic to specify and reason about compu-
tation. We shall assume that the reader is not interested in an in-depth analysis
of the logic but with its application. We state the most relevant results we shall
need about this logic in order to reason about our π-calculus specifications. The
reader who is interested in more details about this logic is referred to [Tiu 2004]
and [Miller and Tiu 2005].
At the core of the logic FOλ∆∇ (pronounced “fold-nabla”) is a first-order logic
for λ-terms (hence, the prefix FOλ) that is the result of extending Gentzen’s LJ
sequent calculus for first-order intuitionistic logic [Gentzen 1969] with simply typed
λ-terms and with quantifiers that range over non-predicate types. The full logic is
the result of making two extensions to this core. First, “fixed points” are added
via the technical device of “definitions,” presented below and marked with the
symbol
△
=. Fixed points can capture important forms of “must behavior” in the
treatment of operational semantics [McDowell and Miller 2000; McDowell et al.
2003]. Fixed points also strengthen negation to encompass “negation-as-finite-
failure.” In the presence of this stronger negation, the usual treatment of λ-tree
syntax via “generic judgments” encoded as universal quantifiers is inadequate: a
more intensional treatment of such judgments is provided by the addition of the
∇-quantifier [Miller and Tiu 2005].
A sequent is an expression of the form B1, . . . , Bn − B0 where B0, . . . , Bn are
formulas and the elongated turnstile − is the sequent arrow. To the left of the
turnstile is a multiset: thus repeated occurrences of a formula are allowed. If the
formulas B0, . . . , Bn contain free variables, they are considered universally quan-
tified outside the sequent, in the sense that if the above sequent is provable then
every instance of it is also provable. In proof theoretical terms, such free variables
are called eigenvariables.
A first attempt at using sequent calculus to capture judgments about the π-
calculus could be to use eigenvariables to encode names in the π-calculus, but this
is certainly problematic. For example, if we have a proof of the sequent − Pxy,
where x and y are different eigenvariables, then logic dictates that the sequent
− Pzz is also provable (given the universal quantifier reading of eigenvariables). If
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the judgment P is about, say, bisimulation, then it is not likely that a statement
about bisimulation involving two different names x and y remains true if they are
identified to the same name z.
To address this problem, the logic FOλ∆∇ extends sequents with a new notion
of “local scope” for proof-level bound variables (originally motivated in [Miller and
Tiu 2003] to encode “generic judgments”). In particular, sequents in FOλ∆∇ are
of the form
Σ ; σ1 ⊲ B1, . . . , σn ⊲ Bn − σ0 ⊲ B0
where Σ is a global signature, i.e., the set of eigenvariables whose scope is over the
entire sequent, and σi is a local signature, i.e., a list of variables scoped over Bi.
We shall consider sequents to be binding structures in the sense that the signa-
tures, both the global and local ones, are abstractions over their respective scopes.
The variables in Σ and σi will admit α-conversion by systematically changing the
names of variables in signatures as well as those in their scope, following the usual
convention of the λ-calculus. The meaning of eigenvariables is as before except
that now instantiation of eigenvariables has to be capture-avoiding with respect to
the local signatures. The variables in local signatures act as locally scoped generic
constants: that is, they do not vary in proofs since they will not be instantiated.
The expression σ ⊲ B is called a generic judgment or simply a judgment. We use
script letters A, B, etc to denote judgments. We write simply B instead of σ ⊲ B
if the signature σ is empty. We shall often write the list σ as a string of variables:
e.g., a judgment (x1, x2, x3) ⊲ B will be written as x1x2x3 ⊲ B. If the list x1, x2, x3
is known from context we shall also abbreviate the judgment as x¯ ⊲ B.
Following Church [1940], the type o is used to denote the type of formulas. The
propositional constants of FOλ∆∇ are ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ⊃ (impli-
cation), ⊤ (true) and ⊥ (false). We shall abbreviate B ⊃ ⊥ as ¬B (intuitionistic
negation). Syntactically, logical constants can be seen as typed constants: for ex-
ample, the binary connectives have type o → o → o. For each simple type γ that
does not contain o, there are three quantifiers in FOλ∆∇: namely, ∀γ (universal
quantifier), ∃γ (existential quantifier), ∇γ (nabla), each one of type (γ → o) → o.
The subscript type γ is often dropped when it can be inferred from context or
its value is not important. Since we do not allow quantification over predicates,
this logic is proof-theoretically similar to first-order logic. The inference rules for
FOλ∆∇ that do not deal with definitions are given in Figure 1.
During the search for proofs (reading rules bottom up), inference rules for ∀ and
∃ quantifier place new variables (eigenvariables) into the global signature while the
inference rules for ∇ place new variables into a local signature. In the ∀R and
∃L rules, raising [Miller 1992] is used when replacing the bound variable x (which
can be substituted for by terms containing variables in both the global signature
and the local signature σ) with the variable h (which can only be instantiated with
terms containing variables in the global signature). In order not to miss substitution
terms, the variable x is replaced by the term (hx1 . . . xn): the latter expression is
written simply as (hσ) where σ is the list x1, . . . , xn. As is usual, the eigenvariable
h must not be free in the lower sequent of these rules. In ∀L and ∃R, the term
t can have free variables from both Σ and σ, a fact that is given by the typing
judgment Σ, σ ⊢ t : τ . The ∇L and ∇R rules have the proviso that y is not free
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Σ ; σ ⊲ B,Γ − σ ⊲ B
init
Σ ; ∆ − B Σ ; B,Γ − C
Σ ; ∆,Γ − C
cut
Σ ; σ ⊲ B, σ ⊲ C,Γ − D
Σ ; σ ⊲ B ∧ C,Γ − D
∧L
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ C
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B ∧ C
∧R
Σ ; σ ⊲ B,Γ − D Σ ; σ ⊲ C,Γ − D
Σ ; σ ⊲ B ∨C,Γ − D
∨L
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B ∨ C
∨R
Σ ; σ ⊲⊥,Γ − B
⊥L
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ C
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B ∨ C
∨R
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B Σ ; σ ⊲ C,Γ − D
Σ ; σ ⊲ B ⊃ C,Γ − D
⊃ L
Σ ; σ ⊲ B,Γ − σ ⊲ C
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B ⊃ C
⊃ R
Σ, σ ⊢ t : γ Σ ; σ ⊲ B[t/x],Γ − C
Σ ; σ ⊲ ∀γx.B,Γ − C
∀L
Σ, h ; Γ − σ ⊲ B[(h σ)/x]
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ ∀x.B
∀R
Σ, h ; σ ⊲ B[(h σ)/x],Γ − C
Σ ; σ ⊲ ∃x.B,Γ − C
∃L
Σ, σ ⊢ t : γ Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ B[t/x]
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲ ∃γx.B
∃R
Σ ; (σ, y) ⊲ B[y/x],Γ − C
Σ ; σ ⊲∇x B,Γ − C
∇L
Σ ; Γ − (σ, y) ⊲ B[y/x]
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲∇x B
∇R
Σ ; B,B,Γ − C
Σ ; B,Γ − C
cL
Σ ; Γ − C
Σ ; B,Γ − C
wL
Σ ; Γ − σ ⊲⊤
⊤R
Fig. 1. The inference rules of FOλ∆∇ not dealing with definitions.
in ∇x B. The introduction rules for propositional connectives are the standard
ones for intuitionistic logic. Reading the rules top down, the structural rule cL
(contraction) allows removal of duplicate judgments from the sequent and the rule
wL (weakening) allows introduction of a (possibly new) judgment into the sequent.
Note that since the initial rule init has implicit weakening, the weakening rule wL
can actually be shown admissible, hence it is strictly speaking not necessary. It
is, however, convenient for interactive proof search, since it allows one to remove
irrelevant formulae (reading the rule bottom up) in a sequent.
While sequent calculus introduction rules generally only introduce logical connec-
tives, the full logic FOλ∆∇ additionally allows introduction of atomic judgments;
that is, judgments which do not contain any occurrences of logical constants. To
each atomic judgment, A, we associate a defining judgment, B, the definition of
A. The introduction rule for the judgment A is in effect done by replacing A
with B during proof search. This notion of definitions is an extension of work by
Schroeder-Heister [1993], Eriksson [1991], Girard [1992], Sta¨rk [1994], and McDow-
ell and Miller [2000]. These inference rules for definitions allow for modest reasoning
about the fixed points of (recursive) definitions.
Definition 1. A definition clause is written ∀x¯[p t¯
△
= B], where p is a predicate
constant, every free variable of the formula B is also free in at least one term in the
list t¯ of terms, and all variables free in p t¯ are contained in the list x¯ of variables.
The atomic formula p t¯ is called the head of the clause, and the formula B is called
the body. The symbol
△
= is used simply to indicate a definitional clause: it is not a
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logical connective.
Let ∀τ1x1 . . . ∀τnxn.H
△
= B be a definition clause. Let y1, . . . , ym be a list of
variables of types α1, . . . , αm, respectively. The raised definition clause of H with
respect to the signature {y1 : α1, . . . , ym : αm} is defined as
∀h1 . . . ∀hn.y¯ ⊲ Hθ
△
= y¯ ⊲ Bθ
where θ is the substitution [(h1 y¯)/x1, . . . , (hn y¯)/xn] and hi is of type α1 → . . .→
αm → τi, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A definition is a set of definition clauses together
with their raised clauses.
Recall that we use script letters, such as B, H, etc., to refer to generic judgments.
In particular, in referring to a raised definition clause, e.g.,
∀h1 . . . ∀hn.y¯ ⊲ Hθ
△
= y¯ ⊲ Bθ
we shall sometimes simply write H
△
= B when the local signatures can be inferred
from context or are unimportant to the discussion.
To guarantee the consistency (and cut-elimination) of the logic FOλ∆∇, we need
some kind of stratification of definition so as to avoid a situation where a definition
of a predicate depends negatively on itself. For this purpose, we associate to each
predicate p a natural number lvl(p), the level of p. The notion of level is generalized
to formulas as follows.
Definition 2. Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is defined as follows:
(1) lvl(p t¯) = lvl(p)
(2) lvl(⊥) = lvl(⊤) = 0
(3) lvl(B ∧ C) = lvl(B ∨ C) = max(lvl(B), lvl(C))
(4) lvl(B ⊃ C) = max(lvl(B) + 1, lvl(C))
(5) lvl(∀x.B) = lvl(∇x.B) = lvl(∃x.B) = lvl(B).
We shall require that for every definition clause ∀x¯[p t¯
△
= B], lvl(B) ≤ lvl(p).
Note that the stratification condition above implies that in a stratified definition,
say ∀x¯[p t¯
△
= B], the predicate p can only occur strictly positively in B (if it occurs
at all). All definitions considered in this paper can be easily stratified according
to the above definition and cut-elimination holds for the logic using them. For the
latter, we refer the reader to [Miller and Tiu 2005] for the full details.
The introduction rules for a defined judgment are as follows. When applying the
introduction rules, we shall omit the outer quantifiers in a definition clause and
assume implicitly that the free variables in the definition clause are distinct from
other variables in the sequent.
{Σθ ; Bθ,Γθ − Cθ | θ ∈ CSU(A,H) for some raised clause H
△
= B}
Σ ; A,Γ − C
defL
Σ ; Γ − Bθ
Σ ; Γ − A defR, where H
△
= B is a raised definition clause and Hθ = A
In the above rules, we apply substitution to judgments. The result of applying a
substitution θ to a generic judgment x1, . . . , xn ⊲B, written as (x1, . . . , xn ⊲B)θ, is
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y1, . . . , yn ⊲B
′, if (λx1 . . . λxn.B)θ is equal (modulo λ-conversion) to λy1 . . . λyn.B
′.
If Γ is a multiset of generic judgments, then Γθ is the multiset {Jθ | J ∈ Γ}. In
the defL rule, we use the notion of complete set of unifiers (CSU) [Huet 1975]. We
denote by CSU(A,H) the complete set of unifiers for the pair (A,H): that is, for
any substitution θ such that Aθ = Hθ, there is a substitution ρ ∈ CSU(A,H) such
that θ = ρ ◦ θ′ for some substitution θ′. In all the applications of defL in this
paper, the set CSU(A,H) is either empty (the two judgments are not unifiable)
or contains a single substitution denoting the most general unifier. The signature
Σθ in defL denotes a signature obtained from Σ by removing the variables in the
domain of θ and adding the variables in the range of θ. In the defL rule, reading
the rule bottom-up, eigenvariables can be instantiated in the premise, while in the
defR rule, eigenvariables are not instantiated. The set that is the premise of the
defL rule means that that rule instance has a premise for every member of that set:
if that set is empty, then the premise is proved.
Equality for terms can be defined in FOλ∆∇ using the single definition clause
[∀x. x = x
△
= ⊤]. Specializing the defL and defR rules to equality yields the
inference rules
{Σθ ; Γθ − Cθ | θ ∈ CSU(λy¯.s, λy¯.t)}
Σ ; y¯ ⊲ s = t,Γ − C Σ ; Γ − y¯ ⊲ t = t
Disequality s 6= t, the negation of equality, is an abbreviation for (s = t) ⊃ ⊥.
One might find the following analogy with logic programming helpful: if a defi-
nition is viewed as a logic program, then the defR rule captures backchaining and
the defL rule corresponds to case analysis on all possible ways an atomic judgment
could be proved. In the case where the program has only finitely many computa-
tion paths, we can effectively encode negation-as-failure using defL [Hallna¨s and
Schroeder-Heister 1991].
3. SOME META-THEORY OF THE LOGIC
Once we have written a computational specification as logical formulas, it is impor-
tant that the underlying logic has formal properties that allow us to reason about
that specification. In this section, we list a few formal properties of FOλ∆∇ that
will be used later in this paper.
Cut-elimination for FOλ∆∇ [Miller and Tiu 2005; Tiu 2004] is probably the single
most important meta-theoretic property needed. Beside guaranteeing the consis-
tency of the logic, it also provides completeness for cut-free proofs: these proofs
are used to help prove the adequacy of a logical specification. For example, the
proof that a certain specification actually encodes the one-step transition relation
or the bisimulation relation starts by examining the highly restricted structure of
cut-free proofs. Also, cut-elimination allows use of modus ponens and substitutions
into cut-free proofs and to be assured that another cut-free proof arises from that
operation.
Another important structural property of provability is the invertibility of infer-
ence rules. An inference rule of logic is invertible if the provability of the conclusion
implies the provability of the premise(s) of the rule. The following rules in FOλ∆∇
are invertible: ∧R,∧L,∨L,⊃ R, ∀R, ∃L, defL (see [Tiu 2004] for a proof). Knowing
the invertibility of a rule can be useful in determining some structure of a proof.
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For example, if we know that a sequent A ∨ B,Γ − C is provable, then by the
invertibility of ∨L, we know that it must be the case that A,Γ − C and B,Γ − C
are provable.
We now present several meta-theoretic properties of provability that are specif-
ically targeted at the ∇-quantifier. These properties are useful when proving the
adequacy of our specifications of bisimulation and modal logic in the following sec-
tions. These properties also provide some insights into the differences between the
universal and the ∇ quantifiers. The proofs of the propositions listed in this section
can be found in [Tiu 2004].
Throughout the paper, we shall use the following notation for provability: We
shall write ⊢ Σ ; Γ − C to denote the fact the sequent Σ ; Γ − C is provable, and
⊢ B to denote provability of the sequent . ; . − B.
The following proposition states that the global scope of an eigenvariable can be
weakened to be a locally scoped variable when there are no assumptions.
Proposition 3. If ⊢ ∀xB then ⊢ ∇xB.
Notice that the implication ∀τxB ⊃ ∇τxB does not necessarily hold. For exam-
ple, if the type τ is empty, then ∀τxB may be true vacuously, independently of the
structure of B, whereas attempting to prove ∇xB reduces to attempting to prove
B given the fresh element x of type τ .
As we suggested in Section 1 with the formula ∇xγ∇yγ .x 6= y, the converse of
Proposition 3 is not true in general. That converse does hold, however, if we use
definitions and formulas that do not contain implications and, consequently, do not
contain negations (since these are formally defined as implications). Horn clauses
provide an interesting fragment of logic that does not contain negations: in that
setting, the distinction between ∇ and ∀ cannot be observed using the proof system.
More precisely, let hc∀∇-formulas (for Horn clauses formulas with ∀ and ∇) be a
formulas that do not contain occurrences of the logical constant ⊃ (implication).
A hc∀∇-definition is a definition whose bodies are hc∀∇-formulas. For example,
the definition of the one-step transition in Figure 2 is an hc∀∇-definition but the
definition of bisimulation in Figure 3 is not a hc∀∇-definition.
Proposition 4. Let D be a hc∀∇-definition and ∀xG be a hc∀∇-formula. Then,
assuming D is the only definition used, ∀xG is provable if and only if ∇xG is
provable.
The above proposition highlights the fact that positive occurrences of ∇ are
interchangeable with ∀. The specification of the operational semantics of the π-
calculus in the next section uses only positive occurences of∇, hence its specification
can be done also in a logic without ∇. However, our specifications of bisimulation
and modal logics in the subsequent sections make use of implications in definitions
and, as a result, ∇ cannot be replaced with ∀. We shall come back to this discussion
on the distinction between∇ and ∀ when we present the specification of bisimulation
in Section 5.
Finally, we state a technical result about proofs in FOλ∆∇ that states that
provability of a sequent is not affected by the application of substitutions.
Proposition 5. Let Π be a proof of Σ ; Γ − C. Then for any substitution θ,
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, 20YY.
10 · A. Tiu and D. Miller
there exists a proof Π′ of Σθ ; Γθ − Cθ such that the height of proof of Π′ is less
than or equal to the height of Π.
4. LOGICAL SPECIFICATION OF ONE-STEP TRANSITION
The finite π-calculus is the fragment of the π-calculus without recursion (or repli-
cation). In particular, process expressions are defined as
P ::= 0 | x¯y.P | x(y).P | τ.P | (x)P | [x = y]P | P|P | P+ P.
We use the symbols P, Q, R, S, T to denote processes and lower case letters, e.g.,
a, b, c, d, x, y, z to denote names. The occurrence of y in the processes x(y).P and
(y)P is a binding occurrence with P as its scope. The set of free names in P is
denoted by fn(P), the set of bound names is denoted by bn(P). We write n(P) for
the set fn(P) ∪ bn(P). We consider processes to be equivalent if they are identical
up to a renaming of bound variables.
The relation of one-step (late) transition [Milner et al. 1992] for the π-calculus
is denoted by P
α
−−→ Q, where P and Q are processes and α is an action. The kinds
of actions are the silent action τ , the free input action xy, the free output action
x¯y, the bound input action x(y), and the bound output action x¯(y). The name y
in x(y) and x¯(y) is a binding occurrence. Just as we did with processes, we use
fn(α), bn(α) and n(α) to denote free names, bound names, and names in α. An
action without binding occurrences of names is a free action (this includes the silent
action); otherwise it is a bound action.
Three primitive syntactic categories are used to encode the π-calculus into λ-tree
syntax: n for names, p for processes, and a for actions. We do not assume any
inhabitants of type n: as a consequence, a free name is translated to a variable of
type n that is either universally or ∇-quantified, depending on whether we want to
allow names to be instantiated or not. For instance, when encoding late bisimula-
tion, free names correspond to ∇-quantified variables, while when encoding open
bisimulation, free names correspond to universally quantified variables (Section 5).
Since the rest of this paper is about the π-calculus, the ∇ quantifier will from now
on only be used at type n.
There are three constructors for actions: τ : a (for the silent action) and the
two constants ↓ and ↑, both of type n → n → a (for building input and output
actions, respectively). The free output action x¯y, is encoded as ↑ xy while the
bound output action x¯(y) is encoded as λy (↑xy) (or the η-equivalent term ↑x).
The free input action xy, is encoded as ↓ xy while the bound input action x(y) is
encoded as λy (↓ xy) (or simply ↓x). Notice that bound input and bound output
actions have type n→ a instead of a.
The following are process constructors, where + and | are written as infix:
0 : p τ : p→ p out : n→ n→ p→ p in : n→ (n→ p)→ p
+ : p→ p→ p | : p→ p→ p match : n→ n→ p→ p ν : (n→ p)→ p
Notice τ is overloaded by being used as a constructor of actions and of processes.
The one-step transition relation is represented using two predicates: The predicate
·1
·2
−−→ ·3 of type p → a → p → o, where the first argument (indicated with ·1) is
of type p, the second argument is of type a, and the third argument is of type p,
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encodes transitions involving the free actions while the predicate ·1
·2
−−⇀ ·3 of type
p → (n → a) → (n → p) → o encodes transitions involving bound values. The
precise translation of the π-calculus syntax into simply typed λ-terms is given in the
following definition. We assume that names in π-calculus processes are translated
to variables (of the same names) in the meta logic.
Definition 6. The following function [[.]] translates process expressions to βη-
long normal terms of type p.
[[0]] = 0 [[P+ Q]] = [[P]] + [[Q]] [[P|Q]] = [[P]] | [[Q]] [[τ.P]] = τ [[P]]
[[[x = y]P]] = match x y [[P]] [[x¯y.P]] = out x y [[P]]
[[x(y).P]] = in x λy.[[P]] [[(x)P]] = νλx.[[P]]
We abbreviate νλx.P as simply νx.P . The one-step transition judgments are trans-
lated to atomic formulas as follows (we overload the symbol [[.]]).
[[P
xy
−−→ Q]] = [[P]]
↓ xy
−−→ [[Q]] [[P
x(y)
−−→ Q]] = [[P]]
↓x
−−⇀ λy.[[Q]]
[[P
x¯y
−−→ Q]] = [[P]]
↑ xy
−−→ [[Q]] [[P
x¯(y)
−−→ Q]] = [[P]]
↑x
−−⇀ λy.[[Q]]
[[P
τ
−−→ Q]] = [[P]]
τ
−−→ [[Q]]
Notice that we mention encodings of free input actions and free input transi-
tion judgments. Since we shall be concerned only with late transition systems,
these will not be needed in subsequent specifications. Giving these actions and
judgments explicit encodings, however, simplifies the argument for the adequacy of
representations of these syntactic judgments: that is, every βη-normal term of type
a corresponds to an action in the π-calculus, and similarly, every atomic formula
encoding of a one-step transition judgment (in βη-normal form) corresponds to a
one-step transition judgment in the π-calculus.
Figure 2 contains a definition, called Dpi, that encodes the operational semantics
of the late transition system for the finite π-calculus. In this specification, free
variables are schema variables that are assumed to be universally scoped over the
definition clause in which they appear. These schema variables have primitive types
such as a, n, and p as well as functional types such as n→ a and n→ p.
Notice that, as a consequence of using λ-tree syntax for this specification, the
usual side conditions in the original specifications of the π-calculus [Milner et al.
1992] are no longer present. For example, the side condition that X 6= n in the
open rule is implicit, since X is outside the scope of n and, therefore, cannot be
instantiated with n (substitutions into logical expressions cannot capture bound
variable names). The adequacy of our encoding is stated in the following lemma
and proposition (their proofs can be found in [Tiu 2004]).
Lemma 7. The function [[.]] is a bijection between α-equivalence classes of process
expressions and βη-equivalence classes of terms of type p whose free variables (if
any) are of type n.
Proposition 8. Let P and Q be processes and α an action. Let n¯ be a list of
free names containing the free names in P, Q, and α. The transition P
α
−−→ Q is
derivable in the π-calculus if and only if . ; . − ∇n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is provable in FOλ∆∇
with the definition Dpi.
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tau: τ P
τ
−−→ P
△
= ⊤
in: in X M
↓X
−−⇀M
△
= ⊤
out: out x y P
↑ xy
−−→ P
△
= ⊤
match: match x x P
A
−−→ Q
△
= P
A
−−→ Q
match x x P
A
−−⇀ Q
△
= P
A
−−⇀ Q
sum: P +Q
A
−−→ R
△
= P
A
−−→ R
P +Q
A
−−→ R
△
= Q
A
−−→ R
P +Q
A
−−⇀ R
△
= P
A
−−⇀ R
P +Q
A
−−⇀ R
△
= Q
A
−−⇀ R
par: P |Q
A
−−→ P ′ |Q
△
= P
A
−−→ P ′
P |Q
A
−−→ P |Q′
△
= Q
A
−−→ Q′
P |Q
A
−−⇀ λn(M n |Q)
△
= P
A
−−⇀M
P |Q
A
−−⇀ λn(P |N n)
△
= Q
A
−−⇀ N.
res: νn.Pn
A
−−→ νn.Qn
△
= ∇n(Pn
A
−−→ Qn)
νn.Pn
A
−−⇀ λm νn.P ′nm
△
= ∇n(Pn
A
−−⇀ P ′n)
open: νn.Mn
↑X
−−⇀M ′
△
= ∇n(Mn
↑Xn
−−→M ′n)
close: P |Q
τ
−−→ νn.(Mn |Nn)
△
= ∃X.P
↓X
−−⇀M ∧Q
↑X
−−⇀ N
P |Q
τ
−−→ νn.(Mn |Nn)
△
= ∃X.P
↑X
−−⇀M ∧Q
↓X
−−⇀ N
com: P |Q
τ
−−→ MY |Q′
△
= ∃X.P
↓X
−−⇀M ∧Q
↑XY
−−→ Q′
P |Q
τ
−−→ P ′ |NY
△
= ∃X.P
↑XY
−−→ P ′ ∧Q
↓X
−−⇀ N
Fig. 2. Definition clauses for the late transition system.
If our goal was only to correctly encode one-step transitions for the π-calculus
then we would need neither ∇ nor definitions. In particular, let D∀pi be the result
of replacing all ∇ quantifiers in Dpi with ∀ quantifiers. A slight generalization of
Proposition 4 (see [Miller and Tiu 2005; Tiu 2004]) allows us to conclude that
. ; . − ∇n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is provable in FOλ∆∇ with the definition Dpi if and only if
. ; . − ∀n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is provable in FOλ∆∇ with the definition D∀pi. Furthermore, we
can also do with the simpler notions of theory or assumptions and not definition. In
particular, let Ppi be the set of implications that result from changing all definition
clauses in D∀pi into reverse implications (i.e., the head is implied by the body).
We can then conclude that . ; . − ∀n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is provable in FOλ∆∇ with the
definition D∀pi if and only if . ; Ppi − ∀n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is provable in intuitionistic
(and classical) logic. In fact, such a specification of the one-step transitions in the
π-calculus as a theory without ∇ dates back to at least Miller and Palamidessi
[1999].
Definitions and ∇ are needed, however, for proving non-Horn properties (that is,
properties requiring a strong notion of negation). The following proposition is a
dual of Proposition 8. Its proof can be found in the appendix.
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Proposition 9. Let P and Q be processes and α an action. Let n¯ be a list of
free names containing the free names in P, Q, and α. The transition P
α
−−→ Q is
not derivable in the π-calculus if and only if . ; . − ¬∇n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is provable in
FOλ∆∇ with the definition Dpi.
The following example illustrates how a negation can be proved in FOλ∆∇.
When writing encoded process expressions, we shall use, instead, the syntax of the
π-calculus along with the usual abbreviations: for example, when a name z is used
as a prefix, it denotes the prefix z(w) where w is vacuous in its scope; when a name
z¯ is used as a prefix it denotes the output prefix z¯a for some fixed name a. We
also abbreviate (y)x¯y.P as x¯(y).P and the process term 0 is omitted if it appears
as the continuation of a prefix. We assume that the operators | and + associate to
the right, e.g., we write P +Q+R to denote P + (Q+R).
Example 10. Consider the process (y)([x = y]x¯z), which could be the continua-
tion of some other process which inputs x on some channel, e.g., a(x).(y)[x = y]x¯z.
Since the bound variable y is different from any name substituted for x, that process
cannot make a transition and the following formula should be provable.
∀x∀z∀Q∀α.[((y)[x = y](x¯z)
α
−−→ Q) ⊃ ⊥]
Since y is bound inside the scope of x, no instantiation for x can be equal to y.
The formal derivation of the above formula is (ignoring the initial uses of ⊃ R and
∀R):
{x, z,Q′, α} ; y ⊲ ([x = y](x¯z.0)
α
−−→ Q′y) − ⊥
defL
{x, z,Q′, α} ; . ⊲∇y.([x = y](x¯z.0)
α
−−→ Q′y) − ⊥
∇L
{x, z,Q, α} ; . ⊲ ((y)[x = y](x¯z.0)
α
−−→ Q) − ⊥
defL
The success of the topmost instance of defL depends on the failure of the unification
problem λy.x = λy.y. Notice that the scoping of term-level variables is maintained
at the proof-level by the separation of (global) eigenvariables and (locally bound)
generic variables. The “newness” of y is internalized as a λ-abstraction and, hence,
it is not subject to instantiation.
The ability to prove a negation is implied by any proof system that can also prove
bisimulation for the π-calculus (at least for the finite fragment): for example, the
negation above holds because the process (y)([x = y]x¯z) is bisimilar to 0 (see the
next section).
5. LOGICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF STRONG BISIMILARITY
We consider specifying three notions of bisimilarity tied to the late transition sys-
tem: the strong early bisimilarity, the strong late bisimilarity and the strong open
bisimilarity. As it turns out, the definition clauses corresponding to strong late and
strong open bisimilarity coincide. Their essential differences are in the quantifica-
tion of free names and in the presence (or the absence) of the axiom of excluded
middle on the equality of names. The difference between early and late bisimula-
tion is tied to the scope of the quantification of names in the case involving bound
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input (see the definitions below). The original definitions of early, late, and open
bisimilarity are given in [Milner et al. 1992; Sangiorgi and Walker 2001]. Here we
choose to make the side conditions explicit, instead of adopting the bound variable
convention in [Sangiorgi and Walker 2001].
Given a relation on processes R, we write P R Q to denote (P,Q) ∈ R.
Definition 11. A process relation R is a strong late bisimulation if R is sym-
metric and whenever P R Q,
(1) if P
α
−−→ P′ and α is a free action, then there is Q′ such that Q
α
−−→ Q′ and
P′ R Q′;
(2) if P
x(z)
−−→ P′ and z 6∈ n(P, Q) then there is Q′ such that Q
x(z)
−−→ Q′ and, for every
name y, P′[y/z] R Q′[y/z]; and
(3) if P
x¯(z)
−−→ P′ and z 6∈ n(P, Q) then there is Q′ such that Q
x¯(z)
−−→ Q′ and P′ R Q′.
The processes P and Q are strong late bisimilar, written P ∼l Q, if there is a strong
late bisimulation R such that P R Q.
Definition 12. A process relation R is a strong early bisimulation if R is sym-
metric and whenever P R Q,
(1) if P
α
−−→ P′ and α is a free action, then there is Q′ such that Q
α
−−→ Q′ and
P′ R Q′,
(2) if P
x(z)
−−→ P′ and z 6∈ n(P, Q) then for every name y, there is Q′ such that Q
x(z)
−−→ Q′
and P′[y/z] R Q′[y/z],
(3) if P
x¯(z)
−−→ P′ and z 6∈ n(P, Q) then there is Q′ such that Q
x¯(z)
−−→ Q′ and P′ R Q′.
The processes P and Q are strong early bisimilar, written P ∼e Q, if there is a strong
early bisimulation R such that P R Q.
Definition 13. A distinction D is a finite symmetric and irreflexive relation on
names. A substitution θ respects a distinction D if (x, y) ∈ D implies xθ 6= yθ.
We refer to the substitution θ as a D-substitution. Given a distinction D and a D-
substitution θ, the result of applying θ to all variables in D, written Dθ, is another
distinction. We denote by fn(D) the set of names occurring in D.
Since distinctions are symmetric by definition, when we enumerate a distinction,
we often omit the symmetric part of the distinction. For instance, we shall write
{(a, b)} to mean the distinction {(a, b), (b, a)}, and we shall also write D ∪ (S×T ),
for some distinction D and finite sets of names S and T , to mean the distinction
D ∪ (S × T ) ∪ (T × S).
Following Sangiorgi [Sangiorgi 1996], we use a set of relations, each indexed by a
distinction, to define open bisimulation.
Definition 14. The indexed set S = {SD}D of process relations is an indexed
open bisimulation if for every distinction D, the relation SD is symmetric and for
every θ that respects D, if P SD Q then:
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ebisim P Q
△
= ∀A∀P ′ [P
A
−−→ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′. Q
A
−−→ Q′ ∧ ebisim P ′ Q′] ∧
∀A∀Q′ [Q
A
−−→ Q′ ⊃ ∃P ′. P
A
−−→ P ′ ∧ ebisim Q′ P ′] ∧
∀X∀P ′ [P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∀w∃Q′. Q
↓X
−−⇀ Q′ ∧ ebisim (P ′w) (Q′w)] ∧
∀X∀Q′ [Q
↓X
−−⇀ Q′ ⊃ ∀w∃P ′. P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧ ebisim (Q′w) (P ′w)] ∧
∀X∀P ′ [P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′. Q
↑X
−−⇀ Q′ ∧∇w.ebisim (P ′w) (Q′w)] ∧
∀X∀Q′ [Q
↑X
−−⇀ Q′ ⊃ ∃P ′. P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧∇w.ebisim (Q′w) (P ′w)]
lbisim P Q
△
= ∀A∀P ′ [P
A
−−→ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′. Q
A
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim P ′ Q′] ∧
∀A∀Q′ [Q
A
−−→ Q′ ⊃ ∃P ′. P
A
−−→ P ′ ∧ lbisim Q′ P ′] ∧
∀X∀P ′ [P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′. Q
↓X
−−⇀ Q′ ∧ ∀w.lbisim (P ′w) (Q′w)] ∧
∀X∀Q′ [Q
↓X
−−⇀ Q′ ⊃ ∃P ′. P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧ ∀w. lbisim (Q′w) (P ′w)] ∧
∀X∀P ′ [P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′. Q
↑X
−−⇀ Q′ ∧∇w. lbisim (P ′w) (Q′w)] ∧
∀X∀Q′ [Q
↑X
−−⇀ Q′ ⊃ ∃P ′. P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧∇w. lbisim (Q′w) (P ′w)]
Fig. 3. Specification of strong early, ebisim, and late, lbisim, bisimulations.
(1) if Pθ
α
−−→ P′ and α is a free action, then there is Q′ such that Qθ
α
−−→ Q′ and
P′SDθQ
′,
(2) if Pθ
x(z)
−−→ P′ and z 6∈ n(Pθ, Qθ) then there is Q′ such that Qθ
x(z)
−−→ Q′ and
P′ SDθ Q
′,
(3) if Pθ
x¯(z)
−−→ P′ and z 6∈ n(Pθ, Qθ) then there is Q′ such that Qθ
x¯(z)
−−→ Q′ and P′ SD′ Q
′
where D′ = Dθ ∪ ({z} × fn(Pθ, Qθ,Dθ)).
The processes P and Q are strong open D-bisimilar, written P ∼Do Q, if there is an
indexed open bisimulation S such that P SD Q. The processes P and Q are strong
open bisimilar if P ∼∅o Q.
Note that we strengthen a bit the condition 3 in Definition 14 to include the
distinction ({z}× fn(Dθ)). Strengthening the distinction this way does not change
the open bisimilarity, as noted in [Sangiorgi and Walker 2001], but in our encoding
of open bisimulation, the distinction D is part of the specification and the modified
definition above helps us account for names better.
Early and late bisimulation can be specified in FOλ∆∇ using the definition
clauses in Figure 3. The definition clause for open bisimulation is the same as
the one for late bisimulation. The exact relationship between these definitions and
the bisimulation relations repeated above will be stated later in this section.
In reasoning about the specifications of early/late bisimulation, we encode free
names as ∇-quantified variables whereas in the specification of open bisimula-
tion we encode free names as ∀-quantified variables. For example, the processes
Pxy = (x|y¯) and Qxy = (x.y¯ + y¯.x) are late bisimilar. The corresponding en-
coding in FOλ∆∇ would be ∇x∇y.lbisim (Pxy) (Qxy). The free names x and y
should not be ∀-quantified for the following, simple reason: in logic we have the
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implication ∀x∀y lbisim (Pxy) (Qxy) ⊃ ∀z lbisim (Pzz) (Qzz). That is, either
∀x∀y lbisim (Pxy) (Qxy) is not provable, or it is provable and we have a proof of
∀z lbisim (Pzz) (Qzz). In either case we lose the adequacy of the encoding.
The definition clauses shown in Figure 3 do not fully capture early and late
bisimulations, since there is an implicit assumption in the definition of these bisim-
ulations that name equality is decidable. This basic assumption on the ability to
decide the equality among names is one of the differences between open and late
bisimulation. Consider, for example, the processes (taken from [Sangiorgi 1996])
P = x(u).(τ.τ + τ) and Q = x(u).(τ.τ + τ + τ.[u = z]τ).
As shown in [Sangiorgi 1996] P and Q are late bisimilar but not open bisimilar:
establishing late bisimulation makes use of a case analysis that depends on whether
the input name u is equal to z or not. Decidability of name equality, in the case of
early and late bisimulation, is encoded as an additional axiom of excluded middle
on names, i.e., the formula ∀x∀y(x = y∨x 6= y). Note that since we allow dynamic
creation of scoped names (via ∇), we must also state this axiom for arbitrary
extensions of local signatures. The following set collects together such generalized
excluded middle formulas:
E = {∇n1 · · · ∇nk∀x∀y(x = y ∨ x 6= y) | k ≥ 0}.
We shall write X ⊆f E to indicate that X is a finite subset of E .
The following theorem states the soundness and completeness of the ebisim and
lbisim specifications with respect to the notions of early and late bisimilarity in the
π-calculus. By soundness we mean that, given a pair of processes P and Q, if the
encoding of the late (early) bisimilarity is provable in FOλ∆∇ then the processes
P and Q are late (early) bisimilar. Completeness is the converse. The soundness
and completeness of the open bisimilarity encoding is presented at the end of this
section, where we consider the encoding of the notion of distinction in the π-calculus.
Theorem 15. Let P and Q be two processes and let n¯ be the free names in P and
Q. Then P ∼l Q if and only if the sequent . ; X − ∇n¯.lbisim P Q is provable for some
X ⊆f E.
Theorem 16. Let P and Q be two processes and let n¯ be the free names in P and
Q. Then P ∼e Q if and only if the sequent . ; X − ∇n¯.ebisim P Q is provable for
some X ⊆f E.
It is well-known that the late bisimulation relation is not a congruence since
it is not preserved by the input prefix. Part of the reason why the congruence
property fails is that in the late bisimilarity there is no syntactic distinction made
between names which can be instantiated and names which cannot be instanti-
ated. Addressing this difference between names is one of the motivations behind
the introduction of distinctions and open bisimulation. There is another important
difference between open and late bisimulation; in open bisimulation names are in-
stantiated lazily, i.e., only when needed. The lazy instantiation of names is intrinsic
in FOλ∆∇; eigenvariables are instantiated only when applying the defL-rule. The
syntactic distinction between names that can be instantiated and those that cannot
be instantiated are reflected in FOλ∆∇ by the difference between the quantifier ∀
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and ∇. The alternation of quantifiers in FOλ∆∇ gives rise to a particular kind of
distinction, the precise definition of which is given below.
Definition 17. A quantifier prefix is a list Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qnxn for some n ≥ 0,
where Qi is either ∇ or ∀. If Qx¯ is the above quantifier prefix, then the Qx¯-
distinction is the distinction
{(xi, xj), (xj , xi) | i 6= j and Qi = Qj = ∇, or i < j and Qi = ∀ and Qj = ∇}.
Notice that if Qx¯ consists only of universal quantifiers then the Qx¯-distinction
is empty. Obviously, the alternation of quantifiers does not capture all possible
distinction, e.g., the distinction
{(x, y), (y, x), (x, z), (z, x), (u, z), (z, u)}
does not correspond to any quantifier prefix. However, we can encode the full notion
of distinction by an explicit encoding of the unequal pairs, as shown later.
It is interesting to see the effect of substitutions on D when D corresponds to a
prefix Qx¯. Suppose Qx¯ is the prefix Q1u¯∀xQ2v¯∀yQ3w¯. Since any two ∀-quantified
variables are not made distinct in the definition of Qx¯ prefix, there is a θ which
respects D and which can identify x and y. Applying θ to D changes D to some D′
which corresponds to the prefix Q1u¯∀zQ2v¯Q3w¯. Interestingly, these two prefixes
are related by logical implication:
Q1u¯∀xQ2v¯∀yQ3w¯.P ⊃ Q1u¯∀zQ2v¯Q3w¯.P [z/x, z/y]
for any formula P . This observation suggests the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Let D be a Qx¯-distinction and let θ be a D-substitution. Then the
distinction Dθ corresponds to some prefix Q′y¯ such that Qx¯.P ⊃ Q′y¯.P θ for any
formula P such that fv(P ) ⊆ {x¯}.
Definition 19. Let D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} be a distinction. The distinc-
tion D is translated as the formula [[D]] = x1 6= y1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn 6= yn. If n = 0 then
[[D]] is the logical constant ⊤ (the empty conjunction).
Theorem 20. Let P and Q be two processes, let D be a distinction and let Qx¯ be
a quantifier prefix, where x¯ contains the free names in P, Q and D. If the formula
Qx¯.([[D]] ⊃ lbisim P Q) is provable then P ∼D
′
o Q, where D
′ is the union of D and
the Qx¯-distinction.
Theorem 21. If P ∼Do Q then the formula ∀x¯.[[D]] ⊃ lbisim P Q is provable,
where x¯ are the free names in P, Q and D.
If a distinction D corresponds to a quantifier prefix Q~x, then it is easy to show
that Q~x.[[D]] is derivable in FOλ∆∇. Therefore, we can state more concisely the
adequacy result for the class of D-open bisimulations in which D corresponds to
a quantifier prefix. The following corollary follows from Theorem 20, Theorem 21
and Proposition 3.
Corollary 22. Let D be a distinction, let P and Q be two processes and let Q~x
be a quantifier prefix such that ~x contains the free names of D, P and Q, and D
corresponds to the Q~x-distinction. Then P ∼Do Q if and only if ⊢ Q~x.lbisim P Q.
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Note that, by Lemma 18, the property of being a quantifier-prefix distinction is
closed underD-substitution. Note also that in Definition 14(3), ifDθ is a quantifier-
prefix distinction then so is
D′ = Dθ ∪ ({z} × fn(Pθ, Qθ,Dθ)).
That is, if Dθ corresponds to a quantifier prefix Q~x, then D′ corresponds to the
quantifier prefix Q~x∇z. Taken together, these facts imply that one can define an
open bisimulation relation which is indexed only by quantifier-prefix distinctions.
That is, the family of relations {SD}D, where each D is a quantifier-prefixed dis-
tinction and each SD is defined as
SD = {(P, Q) | P ∼
D
o Q},
is an indexed open bisimulation.
Notice the absence of the excluded middle assumption on names in the specifi-
cation of open bisimulation. Since FOλ∆∇ is intuitionistic, this difference between
late and open bisimulation is easily observed. This would not be the case if the
specification logic were classical. Since the axiom of excluded middle is present as
well in the specification of early bisimulation (Theorem 16), one might naturally
wonder if there is a meaningful notion of bisimulation obtained from removing the
excluded middle in the specification of early bisimulation and ∀-quantify the free
names. In other words, we would like to see if there is a notion of “open-early”
bisimulation. In fact, the resulting bisimulation relation is exactly the same as open
“late” bisimulation.
Theorem 23. Let P and Q be two processes and let n¯ be the free names in P and
Q. Then ∀n¯.lbisim P Q is provable if and only if ∀n¯.ebisim P Q is provable.
We note that while it is possible to prove the impossibility of transitions (Propo-
sition 9) within FOλ∆∇, it is in general not the case with non-bisimilarity (which
is not even recursively enumerable in the infinite setting). If we have evidence that
two processes are not bisimilar, say, because one has a trace that the other does
not have, then this trace information can be used in the proof a non-bisimulation.
Probably a good approach to this is to rely on the modal logics developed later in
the paper: if processes are not bisimilar, there is an assertion formula that separates
them. We have not planned to develop this particular theme since it seems to us
to not be the main thrust of this paper: describing proofs of non-bisimilarity in the
finite pi-calculus case is an interesting thing that could be developed on top of the
foundation we provide.
To conclude this section, we should explicitly compare the two specifications of
early bisimulation in Definition 12 and in Theorem 16, the two specifications of late
bisimulation in Definition 11 and in Theorem 15 and the two specifications of open
bisimulation in Definition 14 and in Corollary 22. Notice that those specifications
that rely on logic are written without the need for any explicit conditions on variable
names or any need to mention distinctions explicitly. These various conditions are,
of course, present in the detailed description of the proof theory of our logic, but
it seems desirable to push the details of variable names, substitutions, free and
bound-occurrence, and equalities into logic, where they have elegant and standard
solutions.
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(a) Propositional connectives and basic modality:
(true :) P |= true
△
= ⊤.
(and :) P |= A&B
△
= P |= A ∧ P |= B.
(or :) P |= A∨ˆB
△
= P |= A ∨ P |= B.
(match :) P |= 〈X=˙X〉A
△
= P |= A.
(match :) P |= [X=˙Y ]A
△
= (X = Y ) ⊃ P |= A.
(free :) P |= 〈X〉A
△
= ∃P ′(P
X
−−→ P ′ ∧ P ′ |= A).
(free :) P |= [X]A
△
= ∀P ′(P
X
−−→ P ′ ⊃ P ′ |= A).
(out :) P |= 〈↑X〉A
△
= ∃P ′(P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧ ∇y.P ′y |= Ay).
(out :) P |= [↑X]A
△
= ∀P ′(P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∇y.P ′y |= Ay).
(in :) P |= 〈↓X〉A
△
= ∃P ′(P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧ ∃y.P ′y |= Ay).
(in :) P |= [↓X]A
△
= ∀P ′(P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∀y.P ′y |= Ay).
(b) Late modality:
P |= 〈↓X〉lA
△
= ∃P ′(P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧ ∀y.P ′y |= Ay).
P |= [↓X]lA
△
= ∀P ′(P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∃y.P ′y |= Ay).
(c) Early modality:
P |= 〈↓X〉eA
△
= ∀y∃P ′(P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧ P ′y |= Ay).
P |= [↓X]eA
△
= ∃y∀P ′(P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ P ′y |= Ay).
Fig. 4. Modal logics for the π-calculus in λ-tree syntax
6. SPECIFICATION OF MODAL LOGICS
We now present the modal logics for the π-calculus that were introduced in [Milner
et al. 1993]. In order not to confuse meta-level (FOλ∆∇) formulas (or connectives)
with the formulas (connectives) of the modal logics under consideration, we shall
refer to the latter as object formulas (respectively, object connectives). We shall
work only with positive object formulas, i.e., we do not permit negations in those
formulas. Note that since there are no atomic formulas in these modal logics (in
particular, true or false are not atomic), de Morgan identities can be used to remove
all occurrences of negations from such formulas. The syntax of the object formulas
is as follows.
A ::= true | false | A ∧ A | A ∨ A | [x = z]A | 〈x = z〉A
| 〈α〉A | [α]A | 〈x¯(y)〉A | [x¯(y)]A | 〈x(y)〉A | [x(y)]A
| 〈x(y)〉LA | [x(y)]LA | 〈x(y)〉EA | [x(y)]EA
The symbol α denotes a free action, i.e., a free input, a free output, or the silent
action. In each of the formulas 〈x¯(y)〉A, 〈x(y)〉A, 〈x(y)〉LA and 〈x(y)〉EA (and their
dual ‘boxed’-formulas), the occurrence of y in parentheses is a binding occurrence
whose scope is A. We use A, B, C, D to range over object formulas. Note that we
consider only finite conjunctions since the transition system we are considering is
finitely branching, and, therefore, an infinite conjunction is not needed (as noted
in [Milner et al. 1993]). We consider object formulas equivalent up to renaming of
bound variables.
To encode object formulas we introduce the type o′ to denote such formulas and
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introduce the following constants for encoding the object connectives: true and
false of type o′; & and ∨ˆ of type o′ → o′ → o′; 〈·1=˙·2〉·3 and [·1=˙·2]·3 of type
n → n → o′ → o′; 〈·1〉·2 and [·1]·2 of type a → o′ → o′; and 〈↑·1〉·2, [↑·1]·2, 〈↓·1〉·2,
[↓·1]·2, 〈↓·1〉l·2, [↓·1]l·2, 〈↓·1〉e·2, and [↓·1]e·2 of type n → (n → o′) → o′. The
translation of object formulas to λ-tree syntax is given in the following definition.
Definition 24. The following function [[.]] translates object formulas to βη-long
normal terms of type o′.
[[true]] = true [[false]] = false
[[A ∧ B]] = [[A]]&[[B]] [[A ∨ B]] = [[A]]∨ˆ[[B]]
[[[x = y]A]] = [x=˙y][[A]] [[〈x = y〉A]] = 〈x=˙y〉[[A]]
[[〈α〉A]] = 〈α〉[[A]] [[[α]A]] = [α][[A]]
[[〈x¯(y)〉A]] = 〈↑x〉(λy[[A]]) [[[x¯(y)]A]] = [↑x](λy[[A]])
[[〈x(y)〉A]] = 〈↓x〉(λy[[A]]) [[[x(y)]A]] = [↓x](λy[[A]])
[[〈x(y)〉LA]] = 〈↓x〉l(λy[[A]]) [[[x(y)]LA]] = [↓x]l(λy[[A]])
[[〈x(y)〉EA]] = 〈↓x〉e(λy[[A]]) [[[x(y)]EA]] = [↓x]e(λy[[A]])
In specifying the satisfaction relation |= between processes and formulas, we
restrict to the class of formulas which do not contain occurrences of the free input
modality. This is because we consider only the late transition system and the
semantics of the free input modality is defined with respect to the early transition
system. But we note that adding this input modality and the early transition
system does not pose any difficulty. Following Milner et. al., we shall identify an
object logic with the set of formulas it allows. We shall refer to the object logic
without the free input modalities as A−.
The satisfaction relation |= is encoded using the same symbol, which is given
the type p → o′ → o. This satisfaction relation is defined by the clauses in Fig-
ure 4. This definition, called DA−, corresponds to the modal logic A defined in
[Milner et al. 1993], minus the clauses for the free input modality. Notice that
DA− interprets object-level disjunction and conjunction with, respectively, meta-
level disjunction and conjunction. Since the modal logic A− is classical and the
meta-logic FOλ∆∇ is intuitionistic, one may wonder whether such an encoding is
complete. But since we consider only negation-free object formulas and since there
are no atomic formulas, classical and intuitionistic provability coincide for the non-
modal fragment of A−. The definition DA− is, however, incomplete for the full
logic A−, in the sense that there are true assertions of modal logics that are not
provable using this definition alone. Using the ‘box’ modality, one can still encode
some limited forms of negation, e.g., inequality of names. For instance, the modal
judgment
x(y).x(z).0 |= 〈x(y)〉〈x(z)〉(〈x = z〉true ∨ˆ [x = z]false),
which essentially asserts that any two names are equal or unequal, is valid in A, but
its encoding in FOλ∆∇ is not provable without additional assumptions. It turns out
that, as in the case with the specification of late bisimulation, the only assumption
we need to assure completeness is the axiom of excluded middle on the equality
of names: ∀x∀y.x = y ∨ x 6= y. Again, as in the specification of late bisimulation,
we must also state this axiom for arbitrary extensions of local signatures. The
adequacy of the specification of modal logics is stated in the following theorem.
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Theorem 25. Let P be a process, let A be an object formula of the modal logic
A−. Then P |= A if and only if for some list n¯ such that fn(P, A) ⊆ {n¯} and some
X ⊆f E, the sequent X − ∇n¯.([[P]] |= [[A]]) is provable in FOλ
∆∇ with definition
DA−.
The adequacy result stated in Theorem 25 subsumes the adequacy for the spec-
ifications of the sublogics of A−. Note that we quantify free names in the process-
formula pair in the above theorem since we do not assume any constants of type
n. Of course, such constants can be introduced without affecting the provability of
the satisfaction judgments, but for simplicity, we repeat our treatment of names in
the late bisimulation setting here as well.
Notice that the list of names n¯ in Theorem 25 can contain more than just the free
names of P and A. This is important for the adequacy of the specification, since in
the modal logics for the π-calculus, we can specify a modal formula A and a process
P such that the assertion P |= A is true only if there exists a new name which is not
among the free names of both P and A. Consider, for example, the assertion
a(x).0 |= [a(x)]L[x = a]false
and its encoding in FOλ∆∇ as the formula
in a (λx.0) |= [↓a]l(λx.[x=˙a]false).
If we do not allow extra new names in the quantifier prefix in Theorem 25, then we
would have to prove the formula
∇a.
(
in a (λx.0) |= [↓a]l(λx.[x=˙a]false)
)
.
It is easy to see that provability of this formula reduces to provability of
∇a∃x.
(
0 |= [x=˙a]false
)
.
Since we do not assume any constants of type n, the only way to prove this would
be to instantiate x with a, hence,
∇a.(0 |= [a=˙a]false) and ∇a.(a = a) ⊃ 0 |= false.
must be provable. This is, in turn, equivalent to ∇a.0 |= false which should not
be provable for the adequacy result to hold. The key step here is the instantiation
of ∃x. For the original formula to be provable, x has to be instantiated with a
name that is distinct from a. This can be done only if we allow extra names in the
quantifier prefix: for example, the following formula is provable.
∇a∇b.
(
in a (λx.0) |= [↓a]l(λx.[x=˙a]false)
)
Note that in the statement of Theorem 25, the list of names n¯ is existentially
quantified. If one is to implement model checking for A− using the specification in
Figure 4, the issue of how these names are chosen needs to be addressed. Obviously,
the free names of fn(P, A) needs to be among n¯. It remains to calculate how many
new names need to be added. An inspection on the definition in Figure 4 shows
that such new names may be needed only when bound input modalities are present
in the modal formula. More specifically, when instantiating the name quantification
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, 20YY.
22 · A. Tiu and D. Miller
!P
A
−−→ P ′|!P
△
= P
A
−−→ P ′
!P
X
−−⇀ λy(My|!P )
△
= P
X
−−⇀M
!P
τ
−−→ (P ′ |M Y )|!P
△
= ∃X.P
↑XY
−−→ P ′ ∧ P
↓X
−−⇀M
!P
τ
−−→ νz.(Mz |Nz)|!P
△
= ∃X.P
↑X
−−⇀M ∧ P
↓X
−−⇀ N
Fig. 5. Definition clauses for the π-calculus with replication
(∀ or ∃) in a definition clause for a bound input modality, such as in the definition
clause
P |= 〈↓X〉lA
△
= ∃P ′(P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ∧ ∀y.P ′y |= Ay),
we need to consider only cases where y is instantiated to a free name in P |= 〈↓X〉lA,
and where y is instantiated to a new name. For the latter, the particular choice
of the new name is unimportant, since the satisfiability relation for A− is closed
under substitution with new names (cf. Lemma 3.4. in [Milner et al. 1993]). One
can thus calculate the number of new names needed based on the number of bound
input modalities in A.
In [Milner et al. 1993], late bisimulation was characterized by the sublogic LM
of A− that arises from restricting the formulas to contain only the propositional
connectives and the following modalities: 〈τ〉, 〈x¯y〉, 〈x¯(y)〉, [x = y], 〈x(y)〉L, and
their duals. We shall now show a similar characterization for open bisimulation.
The following theorem states that by dropping the excluded middle and changing
the quantification of free names from ∇ to ∀, we get exactly a characterization of
open bisimulation by the encoding of the sublogic LM.
Theorem 26. Let P and Q be two processes. Then P ∼∅o Q if and only if for
every LM-formula A, it holds that ⊢ ∀n¯([[P]] |= [[A]]) if and only if ⊢ ∀n¯([[Q]] |= [[A]]),
where n¯ is the list of free names in P, Q and A.
7. ALLOWING REPLICATION IN PROCESS EXPRESSIONS
We now consider an extension to the finite π-calculus which will allow us to rep-
resent non-terminating processes. There are at least two ways to encode non-
terminating processes in the π-calculus; e.g., via recursive definitions or replications
[Sangiorgi and Walker 2001]. We consider here the latter approach since it leads to
a simpler presentation of the operational semantics. To the syntax of the finite π-
calculus we add the process expression !P . The process !P can be understood as the
infinite parallel composition of P , i.e., P |P | · · · |P | · · ·. Thus it is possible to have a
process that retains a copy of itself after making a transition; e.g., !P
α
−−→ P ′|!P .
The operational semantics for one-step transitions of the π-calculus with replication
is given as the definition clauses Figure 5, adapted to the λ-tree syntax from the
original presentation in [Sangiorgi and Walker 2001]. We use the same symbol to
encode replication in λ-tree syntax, i.e., ! : p→ p.
In order to reason about bisimulation of processes involving !, we need to move to
a stronger logic which incorporates both induction and co-induction proof rules. We
consider the logic Linc [Tiu 2004], which is an extension of FOλ∆∇ with induction
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and co-induction proof rules. We first need to extend the notion of definitions to
include inductive and co-inductive definitions.
Definition 27. An inductive definition clause is written
∀x¯.px¯
µ
= B p x¯
where B is a closed term. The symbol
µ
= is used to indicate that the definition is
inductive. Similarly, a co-inductive definition clause is written
∀x¯.px¯
ν
= B p x¯.
The notion of definition given in Definition 1 shall be referred to as basic definition.
An extended definition is a collection of basic, inductive, or co-inductive definition
clauses.
A definition clause can be seen as a fixed point equation: in fact, Baldle & Miller
[2007] provide an alternative approach to inductive and co-inductive definitions
similar to what is available in the µ-calculus. When definitions are seen as fixed
points, provability of p t¯, depending on whether p is basic, inductive or co-inductive,
means that t¯ is, respectively, in a fixed point, the least fixed point, and the greatest
fixed point of the underlying fixed point equation defining p.
Notice that the head of the (co-)inductive definition clauses contains a predicate
with arguments that are only variables and not more general terms: this restric-
tion simplifies the presentation of the induction and co-induction inference rules.
Arguments that are more general terms can be encoded as explicit equalities in the
body of the clause. We also adopt a higher-order notation in describing the body
of clauses, i.e., we use B p x¯ to mean that B is a top-level abstraction that has
no free occurrences of the predicate symbol p and the variables x¯. This notation
simplifies the presentation of the (co-)induction rules: in particular, it simplifies
the presentation of predicate substitutions.
There must be some stratification on the extended definition so as not to intro-
duce inconsistency into the logic. For the details of such stratification we refer the
interested readers to [Tiu 2004]. For our current purpose, it should be sufficient
to understand that mutual recursive (co-)inductive definitions are not allowed, and
dependencies through negation are forbidden as it already is in basic definitions.
Let px¯
µ
= B p x¯ be an inductive definition. Its left and right introduction rules
are
x¯ ; B S x¯ − S x¯ Σ ; z¯ ⊲ S t¯,Γ − C
Σ ; z¯ ⊲ p t¯,Γ − C
µL
Σ ; Γ − z¯ ⊲ B p t¯
Σ ; Γ − z¯ ⊲ p t¯
µR
where S is the induction invariant, and it is a closed term of the same type as
p. The introduction rules for co-inductively defined predicates are dual to the
inductive ones. In this case, we suppose that p is defined by the co-inductive clause
px¯
ν
= B p x¯.
Σ ; z¯ ⊲ B p t¯,Γ − C
Σ ; z¯ ⊲ p t¯,Γ − C
νL
Σ ; Γ − z¯ ⊲ S t¯ x¯ ; S x¯ − B S x¯
Σ ; Γ − z¯ ⊲ p t¯
νR
Here S is a closed term denoting the co-induction invariant or simulation. Induction
rules cannot be applied to co-inductive predicates and vice versa. The defR and
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defL rules, strictly speaking, are applicable only to basic definitions. But as it is
shown in [Tiu 2004], these rules are derivable for (co-)inductive definitions: that
is, for these definitions, defR can be shown to be a special case of νR and defL a
special case of µL.
The definitions in FOλ∆∇ we have seen so far can be carried over to Linc with
some minor bureaucratic changes: e.g., in the case of bisimulations, we now need to
indicate explicitly that it is a co-inductive definition. For instance, the definition of
lbisim should now be indicated as a co-inductive definition by changing the symbol
△
= with
ν
=. We shall now present an example of proving bisimulation using explicit
induction and co-induction rules. We shall not go into details of the technical
theorems of the adequacy results: these can be found in [Tiu 2004].
Example 28. Let P =!(z)(z¯a | z(y).x¯y) and Q =!τ.x¯a. The only action P can
make is the silent action τ since the channel z is restricted internally within the
process. It is easy to see that P
τ
−−→ (z)(0 | x¯a) |P. That is, the continuation of P is
capable of outputting a free name a or making a silent transition. Obviously Q can
make the same τ action and results in a bisimilar continuation. Let us try to prove
lbisim P Q. The simple proof strategy of unfolding the lbisim clause via defR will
not work here since after the first defR on lbisim (but before the second defR on
lbisim) we arrive at the sequent lbisim ((z)(0 | x¯a) | P) (x¯a | Q). Since P and Q still
occur in the continuation pair, it is obvious that this strategy is non terminating.
We need to use the co-induction proof rules instead.
An informal proof starts by finding a bisimulation (a set of pairs of processes) S
such that (P, Q) ∈ S. Let
S ′ = {(R1 | · · · | Rn | P, T1 | · · · | Tn | Q) | n ≥ 0, Ri is (z)(0 | x¯a) or (z)(0 | 0)
and Ti is either x¯a or 0}.
Define S to be the symmetric closure of S ′. It can be verified that S is a bisimulation
set by showing the set is closed with respect to one-step transitions. To prove this
formally in Linc we need to represent the set S. We code the set S as the following
inductive definition (we allow ourselves to put general terms in the head of this
definition and to have more than one clause: it is straightforward to translate this
definition to the restricted one give above).
inv P Q
µ
= ⊤. inv Q P
µ
= ⊤.
inv ((z)(0 | 0) |M) (0 |N)
µ
= inv M N.
inv (0 |N) ((z)(0 | 0) |M)
µ
= inv N M.
inv ((z)(0 | x¯a) |M) (x¯a |N)
µ
= inv M N.
inv (x¯a |N) ((z)(0 | x¯a) |M)
µ
= inv N M.
Note that for simplicity of presentation, we assume that we have two constants
of type n, namely, x and a, in the logic (but we note that this assumption is not
necessary). The set of pairs encoded by inv can be shown to be symmetric, i.e., the
formula ∀R∀T.inv R T ⊃ inv T R is provable inductively (using the same formula
as the induction invariant).
To now prove the sequent − lbisim P Q, we can use the νR rule with the predicate
inv as the invariant. The premises of the νR rule are the two sequents − inv P Q
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and R, T ; inv R T − BRT , where BRT is the following large conjunction
∀A∀R′ [(R
A
−−→ R′) ⊃ ∃T ′.(T
A
−−→ T ′) ∧ inv R′ T ′] ∧
∀A∀T ′ [(T
A
−−→ T ′) ⊃ ∃R′.(R
A
−−→ R′) ∧ inv T ′ R′] ∧
∀X∀R′ [(R
↓X
−−⇀ R′) ⊃ ∃T ′.(T
↓X
−−⇀ T ′) ∧ ∀w.inv (R′w) (T ′w)] ∧
∀X∀T ′ [(T
↓X
−−⇀ T ′) ⊃ ∃R′.(R
↓X
−−⇀ R′) ∧ ∀w.inv (T ′w) (R′w)] ∧
∀X∀R′ [(R
↑X
−−⇀ R′) ⊃ ∃T ′.(T
↑X
−−⇀ T ′) ∧ ∇w.inv (R′w) (T ′w)] ∧
∀X∀T ′ [(T
↑X
−−⇀ T ′) ⊃ ∃R′.(R
↑X
−−⇀ R′) ∧ ∇w.inv (T ′w) (R′w)].
The sequent reads, intuitively, that the set defined by inv is closed under one-step
transitions. This is proved by induction on inv. Formally, this is done by applying
µL to inv R T , using the invariant
λRλT.inv R T ⊃ BRT.
The sequents corresponding to the base cases of the induction are
inv P Q − B P Q and inv Q P − B Q P
and the inductive cases are given by
inv R T ⊃ BRT − inv ((z)(0 | 0) |R) (0 | T ) ⊃ B((z)(0 | 0) |R)(0 | T ),
inv R T ⊃ BRT − inv ((z)(0 | x¯a) | R) (x¯a | T ) ⊃ B((z)(0 | x¯a) | R)(x¯a | T )
and their symmetric variants. The full proof involves a number of cases of which
we show one here: the other cases can be proved similarly.
We consider a case for free output, where we have the sequent (after applying
some right-introduction rules)

inv R T ⊃ BRT
inv ((z)(0 | x¯a) |R) (x¯a | T )
((z)(0 | x¯a) | R)
A
−−→ R′

 − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
A
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv R′ T ′ (1)
to prove. Its symmetric case can be proved analogously. The sequent (1) can be
simplified by applying defL to the inv predicate, followed by an instance of ⊃ L.
The resulting sequent is{
BRT, inv R T
((z)(0 | x¯a) |R)
A
−−→ R′
}
− ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
A
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv R′ T ′ (2)
There are three ways in which the one-step transition in the left-hand side of the
sequent (1) can be inferred (via defL), i.e., either A is x¯a and R′ is ((z)(0 |0) |R), or
R
A
−−→ R′′ and R′ is (z)(0 | x¯a) |R′′), or A is τ and R
↓X
−−⇀M , R′ is ((z)(0 | 0)|Ma)
for some X and M . These three cases correspond to the following sequents.
BRT, inv R T − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
x¯a
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv ((z)(0 | 0) | R) T ′
BRT, inv R T,R
A
−−→ R′′ − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
A
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv (z)(0 | x¯a) |R′′) T ′
BRT, inv R T,R
↓X
−−→M − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
τ
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv ((z)(0 | 0)|Ma) T ′
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· · · − ⊤
⊤R
· · · − (x¯a | T )
x¯a
−−→ (0 | T )
defR · · · , inv R T − inv R T
init
· · · , inv R T − inv ((z)(0 | 0) |R) (0 | T )
defR
BRT, inv R T − (x¯a | T )
x¯a
−−→ (0 | T ) ∧ inv ((z)(0 | 0) | R) (0 | T )
∧R
BRT, inv R T − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
x¯a
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv ((z)(0 | 0) | R) T ′
∃R
Fig. 6. A derivation in Linc
R
A
−−→ R′′ − R
A
−−→ R′′
init Π
∃V.T
A
−−→ V ∧ inv R′′ V − · · ·
R
A
−−→ R′′ ⊃ ∃V.T
A′
−−→ V ∧ inv R′′ V ,R
A
−−→ R′′ − · · ·
⊃ L
∀U∀A′ R
A
−−→ U ⊃ ∃V.T
A′
−−→ V ∧ inv U V ,R
A
−−→ R′′ − · · ·
∀L;∀L
BRT,R
A
−−→ R′′ − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
A
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv (z)(0 | x¯a) | R′′) T ′
∧L
where Π is
T
A
−−→ V − T
A
−−→ V
init
T
A
−−→ V − (x¯a | T )
A
−−→ (x¯a | V )
defR inv R′′ V − inv R′′ V
init
inv R′′ V − inv ((z)(0 | x¯a) |R′′) (x¯a | V )
defR
T
A
−−→ V, inv R′′ V − (x¯a | T )
A
−−→ (x¯a | V ) ∧ inv (z)(0 | x¯a) | R′′) (x¯a | V )
∧R
T
A
−−→ V, inv R′′ V − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
A
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv (z)(0 | x¯a) | R′′) T ′
∃R
∃V.T
A
−−→ V ∧ inv R′′ V − ∃T ′.(x¯a | T )
A
−−→ T ′ ∧ inv (z)(0 | x¯a) |R′′) T ′
∃L;∧L
Fig. 7. A derivation in Linc given in two parts
The proof of the first sequent is given in Figure 6 and of the second sequent is given
in Figure 7. The proof for the third sequent is not given but it is easy to see that
it has a similar structure to the proof of the second one.
8. AUTOMATION OF PROOF SEARCH
The above specifications for one-step transitions, for late, early, and open bisimu-
lation, and for modal logics are not only declarative and natural, they can also, in
many cases, be turned into effective and symbolic implementations by using tech-
niques from the proof search literature. In this section we outline high-level aspects
of the proof theory of FOλ∆∇ that can be directly exploited to provide implemen-
tations of significant parts of this logic: we also describe how such general aspects
can be applied to some of our π-calculus examples.
8.1 Focused proof search
Since the cut-elimination theorem holds for FOλ∆∇, the search for a proof can be
restricted to cut-free proofs. It is possible to significantly constrain cut-free proofs
to focused proofs while still preserving completeness. The search for focused proofs
has a simple structure that is organized into two phases. The asynchronous phase
applies only invertible inference rules in any order and until no additional invertible
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rules can be applied. The synchronous phase involves the selection of (possibly)
non-invertible inference rule and the hereditary (focused) application of such in-
ference rules until invertible rules are possible again. Andreoli [Andreoli 1992]
provided such a focused proof system for linear logic and proved its completeness.
Subsequently, many focusing systems for intuitionistic and classical logic have been
developed, cf. [Liang and Miller 2007] for a description of several of them. Baelde
and Miller [2007] present a focusing proof system for the multiplicative and ad-
ditive linear logic (MALL) extended with fixed points and show that that proof
system provides a focusing proof system for a large subset of FOλ∆. Focused proof
systems are generally the basis for the automation of logic programming languages
and they generalize the notion of uniform proofs [Miller et al. 1991].
8.2 Unification
Unification can be used in the implementation of FOλ∆∇ proof search in two dif-
ferent ways. One way involves the implementation of the defL inference rule and
the other way involves the determination of appropriate terms for instantiating the
∃ quantifier in the ∃R inference rule and the ∀ quantifier in the ∀L inference rule.
In the specifications presented here, unification only requires the decidable and
determinate subset of higher-order unification called higher-order pattern (or Lλ)
unification [Miller 1991]. This style of unification, which can be described as first-
order unification extended to allow for bound variables and their mobility within
terms, formulas, and proofs, is known to have efficient and practical unification al-
gorithms that compute most general unifiers whenever unifiers exist [Nipkow 1993;
Nadathur and Linnell 2005]. The Teyjus implementation [Nadathur and Mitchell
1999; Nadathur 2005] of λProlog provides an effective implementation of such uni-
fication, as does Isabelle [Paulson 1990] and Twelf [Pfenning and Schu¨rmann 1999].
8.3 Proof search for one-step transitions.
Computing one-step transitions can be done entirely using a conventional, higher-
order logic programming language, such as λProlog: since the definition Dpi for
one-step transitions is Horn, we can use Proposition 4 to show that for the pur-
poses of computing one-step transitions, all occurrences of ∇ in Dpi can be changed
to ∀. The resulting definition is then a λProlog logic program for which Teyjus
provides an effective implementation. In particular, after loading that definition,
we would simply ask the query P
A
−−→ P ′, where P is the encoding of a particular
π-calculus expression and A and P ′ are free variables. Standard logic programming
interpreters would then systematically bind these two variables to the actions and
continuations that P can make. Similarly, if the query was P
A
−−⇀ P ′, logic pro-
gramming search would systematically return all bound actions (here, A has type
n→ a) and corresponding bound continuations (here, P ′ has type n→ p).
8.4 Proof search for open bisimulation.
Theorem proving establishing a bisimulation goal is not done via a conventional
logic programming system like λProlog since such systems do not implement the
∇-quantifier and the case analysis and unification of eigenvariables that is required
for the defL inference rule. None-the-less, the implementation of proof search for
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open bisimulation is easy to specify using the following key steps. (Sequents missing
from this outline are trivial to address.) In the following, we use the quantifier prefix
Q to denote either ∀x or ∇x or the empty quantifier prefix.
(1) When searching for a proof of Σ ; − σ ⊲Q.lbisim P Q apply right-introduction
rules: i.e., simply introduce the quantifier Q (if it is non-empty) and then open
the definition of lbisim.
(2) If the sequent has a formula on its left-hand side, then that formula is σ⊲P
A
−−→
P ′, where P denotes a particular term where all its non-ground subterms are
of type n, and A and P ′ are terms, possibly containing eigenvariables. In this
case, select the defL inference rule: the premises of this inference rule will then
be either (i) the empty-set of premises (which represents the only way that
proof search terminates), or (ii) a set of premises that are all again of the form
of one-step judgments, or (iii) the premise contains ⊤ instead of an atom on
the left, in which case, we must consider the remaining case that follows (after
using the weakening wL inference rule).
(3) If the sequent has the form Σ ; − σ⊲∃Q′[Q
A
−−→ Q′∧B(P ′, Q′)], whereB(P ′, Q′)
involves a recursive call to lbisim and where P ′ is a closed term, then we must
instantiate the existential quantifier with an appropriate substitution. Standard
logic programming techniques can be used to find a substitution for Q′ such
that Q
A
−−→ Q′ is provable (during this search, eigenvariables and locally scoped
variables are treated as constants and P and A denote particular closed terms).
There might be several ways to prove such a formula and, as a result, there
might be several different substitutions for Q′. If one chooses the term T to
instantiate Q′, then one proceeds to prove the sequent Σ ; − σ ⊲Q.lbisim P ′ T .
If the sequent has instead the form Σ ; − σ ⊲ ∃Q′[Q
A
−−⇀Q′ ∧B(P ′, Q′)], then
one proceeds in an analogous manner.
Proof search for the first two cases is invertible (no backtracking is needed for those
cases). On the other hand, the third case is not invertible and backtracking on pos-
sibly all choices of substitution term T might be necessary to ensure completeness.
8.5 The Bedwyr model checker
The various implementation techniques mentioned above—unification of λ-terms,
backtracking focused proof search, unfolding definitions—have all been implemented
within the Bedwyr model checking system [Baelde et al. 2007], which implements
proof search for a simple fragment [Tiu et al. 2005] of FOλ∆∇. The definitions
of one-step transitions and of bisimulation are in this fragment and the Bedwyr
system is a complete implementation of open bisimulation for the finite π-calculus:
in particular, it provides a decision procedure for open-bisimulation. Bedwyr also
implements limited forms of the modal logic described in Section 6. It is also possi-
ble to use Bedwyr to explore why two π-calculus processes might not be bisimilar:
for example, it easy to define traces for such processes and then to search for a
trace that holds of one process but not of the other.
Since Bedwyr is limited to intuitionistic reasoning, it does not fully implement
late bisimulation. We now speculate briefly on how one might extend a system like
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Bedwyr to treat late bisimulation.
8.6 Proof search for late bisimulation.
The main difference between doing proof search for open bisimulation and late
bisimulation is that in the latter we need to select and instantiate formulas from
the set E and explore the cases generated by the resulting ∨L rule. For example,
consider a sequent of the form Σ, x ; E ,Γx − Cx, where Γx∪{Cx} is a set of formulas
which may have x free. One way to proceed with the search for a proof would be
to instantiate ∀z(x = z ∨ x 6= z) twice with the constants a and b. We would then
need to consider proofs of the sequent Σ, x ; x = a ∨ x 6= a, x = b ∨ x 6= b,Γx − Cx.
Using the ∨L rule twice, we are left with four sequents to prove:
(1) Σ, x ; x = a, x = b,Γx − Cx which is proved trivially since the equalities are
contradictory;
(2) Σ, x ; x = a, x 6= b,Γx − Cx, which is equivalent to Σ ; Γa − Ca;
(3) Σ, x ; x 6= a, x = b,Γx − Cx, which is equivalent to Σ ; Γb − Cb; and
(4) Σ, x ; x 6= a, x 6= b,Γx − Cx.
In this way, the excluded middle can be used with a set of n items to produce n+1
sequents: one for each member of the set and one extra sequent to handle all other
cases (if there are any).
The main issue for implementing proof search with this specification of late bisim-
ulation is to determine what instances of the excluded middle are needed: answering
this question would then reduce proof search to one similar to open bisimulation.
There seems to be two extreme approaches to take. At one extreme, we can take
instances for all possible names that are present in our process expressions: deter-
mining such instances is simple but might lead to many more cases to consider than
is necessary. The other extreme would be more lazy: an instance of the excluded
middle is suggested only when there seems to be a need to consider that instance.
The failure of a defR rule because of a mismatch between an eigenvariable and a
constant would, for example, suggest that excluded middle should be invoked for
that eigenvariable and that constant. The exact details of such schemes and their
completeness are left for future work.
9. RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
There are many papers on topics related to the encoding of the operational se-
mantics of the π-calculus into formal systems. An encoding of one-step transitions
for the π-calculus using Coq was presented in [Despeyroux 2000] but the problem
of computing bisimulation was not considered. Honsell, Miculan, and Scagnetto
[Honsell et al. 2001] give a more involved encoding of the π-calculus in Coq and
assume that there are an infinite number of global names. They then build formal
mechanisms to support notions such as “freshness” within a scope, substitution
of names, occurrences of names in expressions, etc. Gabbay [Gabbay 2003] does
something similar but uses the set theory developed in [Gabbay and Pitts 2001]
to help develop his formal mechanisms. This formalism is later given a first-order
axiomatization by Pitts [Pitts 2003], resulting in an extension of first-order logic
called nominal logic. Aspects of nominal reasoning have been incorporated into the
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proof assistant Isabelle [Urban and Tasson 2005] and there has been some recent
work in formalizing the meta theory of the π-calculus in this framework [Bengt-
son and Parrow 2007]. Hirschkoff [Hirschkoff 1997] also used Coq but employed
deBruijn numbers [de Bruijn 1972] instead of explicit names. In the papers that
address bisimulation, formalizing names and their scopes, occurrences, freshness,
and substitution is considerable work. In our approach, much of this same work
is required, of course, but it is available in rather old technology, particularly, via
Church’s Simple Theory of Types (where bindings in terms and formulas were put
on a firm foundation via λ-terms), Gentzen’s sequent calculus, Huet’s unification
procedure for λ-terms [Huet 1975], etc. More modern work on proof search in
higher-order logics is also available to make our task easier and more declarative.
The encoding of transitions for the π-calculus into logics and type systems have
been studied in a number of previous works [Honsell et al. 1998; Despeyroux 2000;
Honsell et al. 2001; Ro¨ckl et al. 2001; Bengtson and Parrow 2007]. Our encoding,
presented as a definition in Figure 2, has appeared in [Miller and Palamidessi 1999;
Miller and Tiu 2003]. The material on proof automation in Section 8 clearly seems
related to symbolic bisimulation (for example, see [Hennessy and Lin 1995; Boreale
and Nicola 1996]) and on using unification and logic programming techniques to
compute symbolic bisimulations (for example, see [Basu et al. 2001; Boreale 2001]).
Since the technologies used to describe these other approaches are rather different
than what is described here, a detailed comparison is left for future work.
It is, of course, interesting to consider the general π-calculus where infinite be-
haviors are allowed (by including ! or recursive definitions). In such cases, one
might be able to still do many proofs involving bisimulation if the proof system
included induction and co-induction inference rules. We have illustrated with a
simple example in Section 7 how such a proof might be done. Inference rules for in-
duction and co-induction appropriate for the sequent calculus have been presented
in [Momigliano and Tiu 2003] and a version of these rules that also involves the
∇ quantifier has been presented in the first author’s PhD thesis [Tiu 2004]. Open
bisimulation, however, has not been studied in this setting. We plan to investigate
further how these stronger proof systems can be used to establish properties about
π-calculus expressions with infinite behaviors.
Specifications of operational semantics using a logic should make it possible to
formally prove properties concerning that operational semantics. This was the case,
for example, with specifications of the evaluation and typing of simple functional
and imperative programming languages: a number of common theorems (determi-
nacy of evaluation, subject-reduction, etc) can be naturally inferred using logical
specifications [McDowell and Miller 2002]. We plan to investigate using our logic
(also incorporating rules for induction and co-induction) for formally proving parts
of the theory of the π-calculus. It seems, for example, rather transparent to prove
that open bisimilarity is a congruence in our setting (see [Ziegler et al. 2005] for a
more general class of congruence relations).
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a meta-logic that allows for declarative specifications of
judgments related to the π-calculus. These specifications are done entirely within
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the logic and without any additional side conditions. The management of name
bindings in the specification of one-step transition, bisimulation, and modal logic
is handled completely by the logic’s three levels of binding, namely, λ-bindings
within terms, the formula-level binders (quantifiers) ∀, ∃, and ∇, and the proof-
level bindings for eigenvariables and local (generic) contexts.
This paper can be seen as part of a tradition of treating syntax more abstractly.
The early, formal treatments of syntax by, for example, Church and Go¨del, for-
malized terms and formulas as strings. Eventually, that treatment of syntax was
replaced by more abstract objects such as parse trees: it is on parse trees that
most syntactic descriptions of the λ-calculus and π-calculus are now given. Unfor-
tunately, parse trees do not come equipped with primitive notions of bindings. To
fix that problem, for example, Prawitz introduced “discharge functions” [Prawitz
1965] and de Bruijn introduced “nameless dummies” [de Bruijn 1972]. The move
from parse trees to λ-trees, along with the use of a logic able to deal intimately
with syntactic abstractions, is another way to fix this problem.
A significant part of this paper deals with establishing adequacy results that show
a formal connection between the “standard” definitions of judgments concerning
the π-calculus and the definitions given in logic (see the appendices for the details).
These adequacy results are all rather tedious and shallow but seem necessary to
ensure that we have not invented our own problems for which we provide good
solutions. It would seem, however, that the tediousness nature of the adequacy re-
sults can be attributed to the large gap between our proof-theory approach and the
“standard” approach used to encode the π-calculus: now that some of these basic
adequacy results have been written down, the adequacy results for any additional
logical specifications using λ-tree syntax should follow more immediately.
We note that our effort in developing a proof theoretic setting for the π-calculus
has led us to find new description for, in particular, the underlying assumptions on
names in open and late bisimulatons. This examination has led us to characterize
the differences between open and late bisimulations in a simple and logical fashion:
in particular, as the difference in name quantification and in the assumption about
decidability of name equality.
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A. PROPERTIES OF ONE-STEP TRANSITIONS
To prove the adequacy results for the encodings of bisimulation and modal logics,
we shall consider some derived rules which allow us to enumerate all possible next
states from a given process. In the following, we use the notation αn → β to denote
the type α→ · · · → α︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
→ β, and we write α∗ → β to denote αn → β for some n ≥ 0.
Due to space limits, some results in this section are stated without proofs, but they
can be found in the electronic appendix of the paper.
Definition 29. The judgments σ ⊲P
A
−−→ Q and σ ⊲P
A
−−⇀Q are higher-order
patterned judgments, or patterned judgments for short, if
(1) every occurrence of the free variables in the judgment is applied to distinct
names, which are either in σ or bound by λ-abstractions, i.e., M a1 · · · an,
where ai ∈ σ or it is bound by some λ-abstraction, and a1, . . . , an are pairwise
distinct,
(2) the only occurrences of free variables in P are those of type nn → n where
n ≥ 0, and the only occurrences of free variables in A are those of type nn → n
or nn → a,
(3) and Q is of the form (M ~σ) for some variable M.
The process term P in the transition predicate P
A
−−→ Q and P
A
−−⇀Q is called a
primary process term. The notion of patterned judgments extends to non-atomic
judgments, which are defined inductively as follows:
—σ ⊲⊤ is a patterned judgment,
—if σ ⊲ B and σ ⊲ C are patterned judgments such that both judgments have no
free variables in common which are of type n∗ → p, then σ ⊲B∧C is a patterned
judgment,
—if σx ⊲ B is a patterned judgment, then σ ⊲∇x.B is a patterned judgment,
—and if σ⊲B[h~σ/y] is a patterned judgment then σ⊲∃y.B is a patterned judgment,
provided that h is of type nn → a or nn → p, and h is not free in ∃y.B.
Two patterned judgments A and B are p-compatible if they do not have variables
in common which are of type n∗ → p.
The restrictions on the occurences of free variables in patterned judgments are
similar to the restrictions used in higher-order pattern unification. This is to en-
sure that proof search for patterned judgments involves only higher-order pattern
unification.
Let ρ be a substitution and let Σ be a signature. We write Σ ⊢ ρ if for every
x ∈ dom(ρ) of type τ , we have Σ ⊢ ρ(x) : τ. Two signatures Σ and Σ′ are said to
be compatible if whenever x : τ1 ∈ Σ and y : τ2 ∈ Σ
′, x = y implies τ1 = τ2. Given
two signature-and-substitution pairs (Σ1, ρ1) and (Σ2, ρ2) such that Σ1 and Σ2 are
compatible, and Σ1 ⊢ ρ1 and Σ2 ⊢ ρ2, we write (Σ1, ρ1) ◦ (Σ2, ρ2) to denote the
pair (Σ1ρ2 ∪ Σ2, ρ1 ◦ ρ2). This definition of composition extends straightforwardly
to composition between a pair and a set or a list of pairs.
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Let us call a signature-substitution pair (Σ, ρ) a solution for a patterned judgment
C if Σ ⊢ ρ and Σ ; . − Cρ is provable. In proving the adequacy of the encoding of
bisimulation and modal logics for the π calculus, we often want to find all possible
solutions to a given transition relation, which corresponds to enumerating all pos-
sible continuations of a given process. For this purpose, we define a construction of
“open” derivation trees for a given list of patterned judgments ∆. Open derivation
trees are trees made of nodes which are instances of certain inference rules. This
construction gives us a set of derivation trees for the sequent ∆ ⊢ ⊥, following a
certain order of rule applications. As we shall see, the construction of the trees
basically amounts to application of left-introduction rules to ∆. We are interested
in collecting all the substitutions generated by the defL rule in these trees, which
we will show to correspond to the solutions for the patterned judgments in ∆.
Definition 30. Let ∆ be a list of patterned judgments such that its elements
are pairwise p-compatible, and let (Σ, θ) be a pair such that Σ ⊢ θ, and that the
free variables of ∆ are in Σ. An open inference rule is an inference on triples of the
form (Σ′,∆′, θ′) where Σ′ is a signature, ∆′ is a list of patterned judgments and θ′
is a substitution such that Σ′ ⊢ θ′. We will use the notation (Σ′, θ′) ⊢ ∆′ to denote
such a triple. Open derivation trees are derivations constructed using the following
open inference rules:
(Σ, θ) ⊢ [ ]
open
(Σ, θ) ⊢ ∆′
(Σ, θ) ⊢ n¯ ⊲⊤,∆′
⊤
(Σ, θ) ⊢ n¯ ⊲ A, n¯ ⊲ B,∆′
(Σ, θ) ⊢ n¯ ⊲ A ∧B,∆′
∧
(Σ ∪ {h}, θ) ⊢ n¯ ⊲ B (h n¯),∆′
(Σ, θ) ⊢ n¯ ⊲ ∃x.B x,∆′
∃
{(Σρ, θ ◦ ρ) ⊢ Bρ,∆ρ | ρ ∈ CSU(A,H), H
△
= B}
(Σ, θ) ⊢ A,∆
def
In the ∃-rule, the eigenvariable h is new, i.e., it is not in Σ. In the def-rule, we require
that for every ρ ∈ CSU(A,H), the judgments Bρ,∆ρ are patterned judgments.
That is, we restrict the CSU’s to those that preserves the pattern restrictions on
judgments. The instances of the open-rule in an open derivation are called open
leaves of the derivation. Given an open derivation Π, we denote with L(Π) the set
of signature-substitution pairs in the open leaves of Π.
Definition 31. The measure of a patterned judgment σ ⊲ B, written |σ ⊲ B|,
is the number of process constructors occuring in the primary terms in B. The
measure of a list of judgments ∆ is the multiset of measures of the judgments in ∆.
Lemma 32. Let ∆ be a list of patterned judgments such that its elements are
pairwise p-compatible, and whose variables are in a given signature Σ. Let θ be a
substitution such that Σ ⊢ θ. Then there exists an open derivation Π of (Σ, θ) ⊢ ∆.
Lemma 33. Let Σ1, Σ2, θ1 and θ2 be signatures and substitutions such that
Σ1 ⊢ θ1 and Σ2 ⊢ θ2. Let ∆ be a list of pairwise p-compatible patterned jugdments
such that all its free variables are in Σ2. If there exists an open derivation Π1 of
(Σ1θ2 ∪Σ2, θ1 ◦ θ2) ⊢ ∆, then there exists an open derivation Π2 of (Σ2, θ2) ⊢ ∆ of
the same height such that L(Π1) = (Σ1, θ1) ◦ L(Π2) and vice versa.
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The following lemma states that the open leaves in an open derivation are solu-
tions of the patterned judgments on the root of the derivation tree. This can be
proved by induction on the height of derivation and case analysis on the definition
clauses of one-step transitions.
Lemma 34. Let ∆ be a list of patterned judgments such that its elements are
pairwise p-compatible and whose variables are in a given signature Σ. Let Π be
an open derivation of (Σ, ǫ) ⊢ ∆. Then for every element C ∈ ∆ and every pair
(Σ′, θ) ∈ L(Π), the sequent Σ′ ; . − Cθ is provable.
We are now ready to define the following derived rules. The rule onef enumerates
all possible free-actions that a process can perform. Given a patterned judgment
n¯ ⊲ P
A
−−→ Q and an open derivation Π of (Σ, ǫ) ⊢ n¯ ⊲ P
A
−−→ Q, the onef rule,
applied to this judgment, is as follows:
{Σ′ ; Γθ − Cθ | (Σ′, θ) ∈ L(Π)}
Σ ; n¯ ⊲ P
A
−−→ Q,Γ − C
onef
The corresponding rule for bound input or bound output transition is defined anal-
ogously, i.e.,
{Σ′ ; Γθ − Cθ | (Σ′, θ) ∈ L(Π)}
Σ ; n¯ ⊲ P
X
−−⇀M,Γ − C
oneb.
where Π is an open derivation of (Σ, ǫ) ⊢ n¯ ⊲ P
X
−−⇀M. Since open inference rules
are essentially invertible left-rules of FOλ∆∇, these derived rules are sound and
invertible.
Lemma 35. The rules onef and oneb are invertible and derivable in FOλ
∆∇.
We can now prove Proposition 9.
Proof. Suppose that P
α
−−→ Q does not hold in the π-calculus. We show that
the sequent ¬∇n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is derivable in FOλ∆∇. This is equivalent to proving
the sequent ; ~n ⊲ [[P
α
−−→ Q]] − ⊥. We apply either onef or oneb to the sequent
(bottom-up), depending on whether α is a free or a bound action. In both cases,
if the premise of the onef or oneb is empty, then we are done. Otherwise, there
exists a substitution θ such that (∇~n.[[P
α
−−→ Q]])θ is derivable in FOλ∆∇. Since
the transition judgment is ground, this would mean that ∇~n.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is derivable,
and by Proposition 8, the transition P
α
−−→ Q holds in the π-calculus, contradicting
our assumption.
Conversely, suppose that ¬∇n¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is derivable in FOλ∆∇. Then P
α
−−→ Q
cannot be a transition in the π-calculus, for otherwise, we would have ⊢ ∇n¯.[[P
α
−−→
Q]] by Proposition 8, and by cut, we would have a proof of ⊥, which is impossible.
B. ADEQUACY OF THE SPECIFICATIONS OF BISIMULATIONS
We need some auxiliary lemmas that concern the structures of cut free proofs. The
next three lemmas can be proved by simple permutations of inference rules.
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Lemma 36. Let Π be a cut-free derivation of · ; Γ − C, where C contains a non-
equality atomic formula and every judgment in Γ is in one of the following forms:
n¯ ⊲ ∀x∀y.x = y ∨ x 6= y n¯ ⊲ ∀y.a = y ∨ a 6= y n¯ ⊲ a = b ∨ a 6= b
n¯ ⊲ a = a ∨ a 6= a n¯ ⊲ a = a n¯ ⊲ a 6= b
for some n¯ and distinct names a, b in n¯. Then there exists a derivation of the
sequent which ends with a right-introduction rule on C.
Lemma 37. The defR rule, applied to lbisim P Q, for any P and Q, is invert-
ible.
Lemma 38. The defR rule, applied to ebisim P Q, for any P and Q, is invert-
ible.
B.1 Adequacy of the specification of late bisimulation
In the following, we use the notation x1 6= x2 6= · · · 6= xn−1 6= xn to abbreviate the
conjunction ∧
{xi 6= xj | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= j}.
With a slight abuse of notation, we shall write X ⊃ B, where X is a finite set of
formula {B1, . . . , Bn} , to mean B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn ⊃ B, and we shall write ∇y.X to
mean the formula ∇y.B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∇y.B2.
Lemma 39. Let P and Q be two late-bisimilar finite π-processes and let n1, . . . , nk
be the free names in P and Q. Then for some finite set X ⊂ E, we have
⊢ ∀n1 · · · ∀nk.(X ∧ n1 6= n2 6= · · · 6= nk ⊃ lbisim P Q). (3)
Proof. We construct a proof of formula (3) by induction on the size of P and Q,
i.e., the number of action prefixes in P and Q. It can be easily shown that the number
of prefixes in a process is reduced by transitions, for finite processes. By applying
the introduction rules for ∀, ⊃ and unfolding the definition of lbisim (bottom up)
to the formula (3), we get the following three sequents:
(1) n1, · · · , nk, A, P
′ ; X , n1 6= · · · 6= nk, P
A
−−→ P ′ − ∃Q′.Q
A
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim P ′ Q′
(2) n1, · · · , nk, X, P
′ ; X , n1 6= · · · 6= nk, P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ − ∃Q′. Q
↓X
−−⇀Q′ ∧
∀w.lbisim (P ′w) (Q′w)
(3) n1, · · · , nk, X, P
′ ; X , n1 6= · · · 6= nk, P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ − ∃Q′. Q
↑X
−−⇀Q′ ∧
∇w.lbisim (P ′w) (Q′w)
and their symmetric counterparts (obtained by exchanging the role of P and Q). The
set X is left unspecified above, since it will be constructed by induction hypothesis
(in the base case, where both P and Q are deadlocked processes, define X to be
the empty set). We show here how to construct proofs for these three sequents;
their symmetric counterparts can be proved similarly. In all these three cases, we
apply either the onef rule (for sequent 1) or the oneb rule (for sequent 2 and 3). If
this application of onef (or oneb) results in two distinct name-variables, say n1 and
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, 20YY.
Proof Search Specifications of the π-calculus · 39
n2, to be identified, then the sequent is proved by using the assumption n1 6= n2.
Therefore the only interesting cases are when the name-variables n1, · · · , nk are
instantiated to distinct name-variables, say,m1, · · · ,mk. In the following we assume
that the substitution in the premises of onef or oneb are non-trivial, meaning that
they do not violate the assumption on name-distinction above.
Sequent 1. In this case, after applying the onef rule bottom up and discharging
the trivial premises, we need to prove, for each θ associated with the rule, the
sequent
m1, · · · ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − ∃Q
′.Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim (P ′θ) Q′
for some signature Σ.We give a top-down construction of a derivation of this sequent
as follows. By Lemma 34, we know that
⊢ m1, · · · ,mk,Σ ; . − Pθ
Aθ
−−→ P ′θ.
Since m1, . . . ,mk are the only free names in Pθ, we can show by induction on proofs
that Σ in the sequent is redundant and can be removed, thus
⊢ m1, · · · ,mk ; . − Pθ
Aθ
−−→ P ′θ.
By the adequacy of one-step transition (Proposition 8), we have Pθ
Aθ
−−→ P ′θ.
Notice that P is a renaming of Pθ, since m1, . . . ,mk are pairwise distinct. We recall
that both one-step transitions and (late) bisimulation are closed under injective
renaming (see, e.g., [Milner et al. 1992]). Therefore, there exist α and R such that
P
α
−−→ R, where α and R are obtained from Aθ and P ′θ, respectively, under the same
injective renaming. Since P and Q are bisimilar, there exists T such that Q
α
−−→ T,
hence, by injective renaming and the adequacy result for one-step transitions, the
sequent m1, · · · ,mk ; . − Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Tθ is provable. It remains to show that
⊢ m1, · · · ,mk ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − lbisim (P
′θ) (Tθ)
By induction hypothesis (note that the size of (R, T) is smaller than (P, Q)), we have
⊢ ∀x1 · · · ∀xj .X
′ ∧ x1 6= · · · 6= xj ⊃ lbisim R T
where {x1, . . . , xj} is a subset of {n1, . . . , nk}. We can weaken the formula with
extra variables and assumptions to get
⊢ ∀n1 · · · ∀nk.X
′ ∧ n1 6= · · · 6= nk ⊃ lbisim R T.
Now since the ∀R and ⊃ R rules are invertible, this means
⊢ n1, . . . , nk ; X
′, n1 6= · · · 6= nk − lbisim R T.
Now define X to be X ′ and apply a renaming substitution which maps each ni to
mi, we get a derivation of
m1, . . . ,mk ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − lbisim (P
′θ) (Tθ).
Since provability is closed under weakening of signature, we have
⊢ m1, . . . ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − lbisim (P
′θ) (Tθ),
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and together with provability of m1, . . . ,mk ; . − Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Tθ, we get
⊢ m1, · · · ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Tθ ∧ lbisim (P ′θ) Tθ.
Finally, applying an ∃R to this sequent, we get
⊢ m1, · · · ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − ∃Q
′.Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim (P ′θ) Q′.
Sequent 2.. In this case, we need to prove the sequent
(∗)m1, · · · ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − ∃Q
′.Qθ
↓Xθ
−−⇀Q′∧∀w.lbisim ((P ′θ)w) (Q′w)
for each non-trivial θ in the premises of oneb rule. By the same reasoning as in
the previous case, we obtain, for every transition Pθ
x(w)
−−→ R, where R = (P ′θ)w,
another transition Qθ
x(w)
−−→ T such that for all name z R[z/w] ∼l T[z/w]. It is enough
to consider k+1 cases for z, i.e., those in which z is one of m1, . . . ,mk and another
where z is a new name, say mk+1. By induction hypothesis, we have, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, a provable formula Fi
∀m1 · · · ∀mk.X1 ∧m1 6= · · · 6= mk ⊃ lbisim (R[mi/w]) (T[mi/w])
and a provable formula Fk+1:
∀m1 · · · ∀mk+1.Xk+1 ∧m1 6= · · · 6= mk+1 ⊃ lbisim (R[mk+1/w]) (T[mk+1/w]).
Let X be the set {∀x∀y.x = y∨x 6= y}∪{Xi | i ∈ {1, . . . , k+1}}. Then the sequent
(∗) is proved, in a bottom-up fashion, by instantiating Q′ to λw.T, followed by an
∧R-rule, resulting in the sequents:
m1, . . . ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − Qθ
Aθ
−−→ λw.T and
m1, . . . ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − ∀w.lbisim R T
The first sequent is provable following the adequacy of one-step transition. For the
second sequent, we apply the ∀R-rule to get the sequent
m1, . . . ,mk,mk+1,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − lbisim (R[mk+1/w]) (T[mk+1/w]).
We then do a case analysis on the name mk+1, using the assumption ∀x∀y.x =
y ∨ x 6= y in X . Let Rk+1 = R[mk+1/w] and let Tk+1 = T[mk+1/w]. We consider k
instantiations, each instantiation compares mk+1 with mi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We
thus get the following sequents:
(S1) Σ
′ ; ∆,m1 = mk+1 − lbisim Rk+1 Tk+1
(S2) Σ
′ ; ∆,m1 6= mk+1,m2 = mk+1 − lbisim Rk+1 Tk+1
...
(Sk) Σ
′ ; ∆,m1 6= mk+1, . . . ,mk−1 6= mk+1,mk = mk+1 − lbisim Rk+1 Tk+1
(Sk+1) Σ
′,mk+1 ; ∆,m1 6= m2, · · · ,mk−1 6= mk,mk 6= mk+1 − lbisim Rk+1 Tk+1
Here Σ′ denotes the set {m1, . . . ,mk+1}∪Σ and ∆ denotes the set {X ,m1 6= · · · 6=
mk}. Provability of these sequents follow from provability of F1, . . . , Fk+1.
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Sequent 3. In this case, we need to prove the sequent
(∗∗) m1, · · · ,mk,Σ ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − ∃Q
′.Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Q′ ∧
∇w.lbisim ((P ′θ)w) (Q′w)
for each non-trivial θ in the premises of oneb rule. As in the previous case, we
obtain R and T such that Pθ
x¯(w)
−−→ R and Qθ
x¯(w)
−−→ T where λw.R = P ′θ. We assume,
without loss of generality, that w is fresh. By the induction hypothesis, R ∼l T and
⊢ ∀m1 · · · ∀mk∀w.X
′ ∧m1 6= · · · 6= mk 6= w ⊃ lbisim R T.
Now apply Proposition 3 to replace ∀w with ∇w,
⊢ ∀m1 · · · ∀mk∇w.X
′ ∧m1 6= · · · 6= mk 6= w ⊃ lbisim R T.
And since ∇ distributes over all propositional connectives, we also have
⊢ ∀m1 · · · ∀mk.(∇wX
′) ∧ ∇w.(m1 6= · · · 6= mk) ∧ ∇w(m¯ 6= w) ⊃ ∇w.lbisim R T.
Let X = ∇wX ′. Now, since the right-introduction rules for ∀, ∇ and ⊃ are all
invertible, we have that the sequent
(i) m1, . . . ,mk ; X ,∇w.(m1 6= · · · 6= mk),∇w(m¯ 6= w) − ∇w.lbisim R T
is provable. It can be easily checked that the following sequents are provable:
∇w.mi 6= mj − mi 6= mj , for any i and j.
− ∇w.mi 6= w, for any i (since w is in the scope of mi).
By applying the cut rules to these sequents and sequent (i) above, we obtain
(ii) m1, . . . ,mk ; X ,m1 6= · · · 6= mk − ∇w.lbisim R T,
Provability of sequent (∗∗) then follows from provability of sequent (ii) above and
the adequacy of the one-step transition (i.e., by instantiating Q′ with λw.T).
The following lemma shows that lbisim is symmetric. Its proof is straightforward
by induction on derivations.
Lemma 40. Let P and Q be two π-processes and let n¯ be the list of all free names
in P and Q. If ⊢ X ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim P Q, for some X ⊂ E, then ⊢ X ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim Q P.
B.2 Proof for Theorem 15 (adequacy of late bisimulation specification)
Soundness. We define a set S as
S = {(P, Q) |⊢ X ⊃ ∇n¯ lbisim P Q, where fn(P, Q) ⊆ {n¯} and X ⊆f E}
and show that S is a bisimulation, i.e., it is symmetric and closed with respect
to the conditions 1, 2 and 3 in Definition 11. The symmetry of S follows from
Lemma 40.
Suppose that (P, Q) ∈ S, that is, ⊢ X ⊃ ∇n¯ lbisim P Q for some X . Since
defR on lbisim is invertible (Lemma 37), and since ∧R, ⊃ R, ∇R and ∀R are
also invertible, there is a proof of the formula that ends with applications of these
invertible rules. From this and the definition of lbisim, we can infer that provability
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, 20YY.
42 · A. Tiu and D. Miller
of X ⊃ ∇n¯ lbisim P Q implies provability of six other sequents, three of which are
given in the following (the other three are symmetric counterparts of these):
(a) P ′, A ; X , n¯ ⊲ P
An¯
−−→ (P ′n¯) − n¯ ⊲ ∃Q′.Q
An¯
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim (P ′n¯) Q′
(b) M,X ; X , n¯ ⊲ P
↓(Xn¯)
−−⇀ (Mn¯) − n¯ ⊲ ∃N.Q
↓(Xn¯)
−−⇀ N ∧ ∀y.lbisim (Mn¯y) (Ny)
(c) M,X ; X , n¯ ⊲ P
↑(Xn¯)
−−⇀ (Mn¯) − n¯ ⊲ ∃N.Q
↑(Xn¯)
−−⇀ N ∧ ∇y.lbisim (Mn¯y) (Ny)
By examing the structure of proofs of these three sequents, we show that S is
closed under all possible transitions from P and Q. We examine the three cases in
Definition 11:
(1) Suppose P
α
−−→ P′ for some free action α. Since P
α
−−→ P′, by the adequacy
result for one-step transitions, we have that n¯ ⊲ P
α
−−→ P′ is derivable. Let ρ =
[λn¯.α/A, λn¯.P′/P ′]. Applying ρ to the derivation of sequent (a), we get
⊢ · ; X , n¯ ⊲ P
α
−−→ P′ − n¯ ⊲ ∃Q′.Q
α
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim P′ Q′.
By a cut between n¯ ⊲ P
α
−−→ P′ and this sequent, we obtain a derivation of
· ; X − n¯ ⊲ ∃Q′.Q
α
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim P′ Q′.
By Lemma 36, we know that there exists a derivation of this sequent which ends
with a right-rule, hence, there exists a process Q′ such that ⊢ · ; X − n¯ ⊲ Q
α
−−→ Q′
and ⊢ · ; X − n¯ ⊲ lbisim P′ Q′. It is easy to show that X plays no part in the proof of
the first sequent, so it can be removed from the sequent. Hence by the adequacy of
one-step transitions, we have Q
α
−−→ Q′. Provability of the second sequent implies
that (P′, Q′) is in the set S. Thus S is indeed closed under the α-transition.
(2) Suppose that P
a(y)
−−→ P′. Applying a similar argument as in the previous case
to sequent (b) with substitution ρ = [λn¯.a/X, λn¯λy.P′/M ], we obtain a provable
sequent
· ; X − n¯ ⊲ ∃N.Q
↓ a
−−⇀N ∧ ∀y.lbisim P′ (Ny).
Again, as in the previous case, using Lemma 36, we can show that Q
a(y)
−−→ Q′ for
some process Q′ such that ⊢ · ; X − n¯ ⊲ ∀y.lbisim P′ Q′. This implies that
(i) X ⊃ ∇n¯∀y.lbisim P′ Q′,
(ii) X ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim (P′[w/y]) (Q′[w/y]), where w ∈ {n¯},
(iii) (∇y.X ) ⊃ ∇y∇n¯.lbisim P′ Q′
are all provable. The formula (ii) is obtained from (i) by instantiating y with one
of n¯. The formula (iii) is obtained from (i) as follows: Since
∇x∀y.P x y ⊃ ∀y∇x.P x y and (A ⊃ ∀y.B) ⊃ (∀y.(A ⊃ B)),
where y is not free in A, are theorems of FOλ∆∇, we can enlarge the scope of
y in (i) to the outermost level: hence, we have that ∀y(X ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim P′ Q′) is
provable. Now apply Proposition 3 to turn ∀y into ∇y, then distribute the ∇y over
the implication ⊃ and conjunction ∧, and we have (iii).
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, 20YY.
Proof Search Specifications of the π-calculus · 43
It remains to show that for every name w, the pair (P′[w/y], Q′[w/y]) is in S. There
are two cases to consider: The case where w is among n¯ follows straightforwardly
from (ii), the other case, where w is a new name, follows from (iii).
(3) Suppose P
a¯(y)
−−→ P′. Using the same argument as in the previous case, we can
show that there exists a process Q′ such that Q
a¯(y)
−−→ Q′ and such that
⊢ · ; X − n¯ ⊲∇y.lbisim P′ Q′.
The latter entails that (P′, Q′) ∈ S, as required.
B.3 Completeness
We are given P ∼l Q and we need to show that ⊢ X ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim P Q, where X ⊆f E
and n¯ = {n1, . . . , nk} includes all the free names in P and Q. From Lemma 39 we
have that
⊢ ∀n1 · · · ∀nk(X
′ ∧ n1 6= · · · 6= nk ⊃ lbisim P Q)
for some X ′ ⊆f E . By Proposition 3, we can turn all the ∀ into ∇, hence
⊢ ∇n1 · · ·∇nk(X
′ ∧ n1 6= · · · 6= nk ⊃ lbisim P Q).
Since ∇ distributes over all propositional connectives, we have
⊢ (∇n¯.X ′) ∧ ∇n¯.(n1 6= · · · 6= nk) ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim P Q.
Now, ∇n¯.n1 6= · · · 6= nk is a theorem of FOλ
∆∇ (since any two distinct∇-quantified
names are not equal), therefore by modus ponens we have
⊢ ∇n¯.X ′ ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim P Q.
Let X = ∇n¯.X ′, then we have X ⊃ ∇n¯.lbisim P Q as required.
B.4 Adequacy of the specification of early bisimulation
The proof for the adequacy of the specification of early bisimulation follows a similar
outline as that of late bisimulation. The proof is rather tedious and is not enlight-
ening. We therefore omit the proof and refer interested readers to the electronic
appendix of the paper for more details.
B.5 Adequacy of the specification of open bisimulation
Proof of Lemma 18: The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the quantifier
prefix Qx¯. At each stage of the induction, we construct a quantifier prefix Qy¯ such
that Qx¯.P ⊃ Qy¯.P θ and Dθ corresponds to the Qy¯-distinction. In the base case,
where the quantifier prefix Qx¯ is empty, the quantifier Qy¯ is also the empty prefix.
In this case we have Pθ = P , therefore P ⊃ Pθ holds trivially. There are the
following two inductive cases.
(1) Suppose Qx¯.P = Q′u¯∇z.P. Let D′ be the distinction that corresponds to Q′u¯.
Note that by definition, we have D = D′ ∪ {(z, v), (x, v) | v ∈ D′}. Let θ′ be
the substitution θ with domain restricted to {u¯}. Since θ respects D, obviously θ′
respects D′ and θ(z) 6= θ(v) for all v ∈ D′. By induction hypothesis, we have a
proof of the formula Qu¯(∇z.P ) ⊃ Qm¯(∇z.P )θ′ for some quantifier prefix Qm¯ such
that D′θ′ is the Qm¯-distinction. Note that since z is not in the domain of θ′, we
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have (∇z.P )θ′ = ∇z.(Pθ′). Let w = θ(z). Since w is distinct from all other free
names in D′θ′, we can rename z with w, thus,
⊢ Qu¯∇z.P ⊃ Qm¯∇w.P (θ′ ◦ [w/z])
But θ′ ◦ [w/z] is exactly θ. Let Qy¯ be the prefix Qm¯∇w. It then follows that
⊢ Qx¯.P ⊃ Qy¯.P θ.
Moreover, Dθ can be easily shown to be the Qy¯-distinction.
(2) Suppose Qx¯ = Q′u¯∀z.P. Note that in this case, the Qx¯-distinction and Q′u¯-
distinction co-incide, i.e., both are the same distinction D. Moreover, z 6∈ fv(D).
Let θ′ be the substitution θ restricted to the domain {u¯}. By induction hypothesis,
we have that ⊢ Qu¯(∀z.P ) ⊃ Qm¯(∀z.P )θ′, for some quantifier prefix Qm¯ such that
Qm¯ corresponds to Dθ′. Note that Dθ′ = Dθ, because z 6∈ fv(D). There are two
cases to consider when constructing Qy¯. The first case is when z is identified, by
θ, with some name in {u¯}. In this case, by the property of universal quantification,
we have that ⊢ Qu¯∀z.P ⊃ Qm¯.Pθ. In this case, we let Qy¯ = Qm¯. Note that Dθ′
is the same as Dθ in this case. Therefore Dθ is the Qy¯-distinction. For the second
case, we have that z is instantiated by θ to a new name, say w. Then following the
same argument as the case with ∇, we have that ⊢ Qu¯∀z.P ⊃ Qm¯∀w.Pθ. In this
case, we let Qy¯ = Qm¯∀w. Note that in this case the Qy¯-distinction also coincides
with Qm¯-distinction, i.e., both are the same set Dθ.
In the proof of soundness of open bisimulation to follow, we make use of a property
of the structure of proofs of certain sequents. The following three lemmas state some
meta-level properties of FOλ∆∇. Their proofs are easy and are omited.
Lemma 41. Suppose the sequent Σ ; ∆ − C is provable, where C is an existential
judgment and ∆ is a set of inequality between distinct terms, i.e., every element of
∆ is of the form n¯ ⊲ s 6= t, for some n¯, s and t. Then there exists a proof of the
sequent ending with ∃R applied to C.
Lemma 42. For any positive formula context C[], ⊢ C[∀x.B] ⊃ C[B[t/x]].
Lemma 43. Let Qx¯ be a quantifier prefix. If Qx¯.P and Qx¯.P ⊃ Q are provable
then Qx¯.Q is provable.
Lemma 44. Let D be a conjunction of inequalities between terms. If ⊢ Qx¯.D ⊃
∇y.P , where y is not free in D, then ⊢ Qx¯∇y.D ⊃ P .
The following lemma is a simple corollary of Proposition 8 and Proposition 4.
Lemma 45. P
α
−−→ Q if and only if Qn¯.[[P
α
−−→ Q]] is provable, where Qn¯ is a
quantifier prefix and n¯ are the free names of P.
To prove soundness of open bisimulation specification, we define a family of sets
S in the following, and show that it is indeed an open bisimulation.
SD = {(P, Q) | ⊢ Qn¯.[D
′] ⊃ lbisim P Q and fn(P, Q, D′) = {n¯} and
D = D′ ∪D′′, where D′′ is the Qn¯-distinction. }
Suppose (P, Q) ∈ SD. That is, ⊢ Qn¯.[D
′] ⊃ lbisim P Q. Let D′′ be the distinction
that corresponds to the prefix Qn¯. We have to show that for every name substi-
tution θ which respects D, the set S is closed under conditions 1, 2, and 3 in
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Definition 14. Since θ respects D, it also respects D′′ (since D′′ is a subset of D).
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 18 that there exists a prefix Qx¯ such that D′′θ is
the Qx¯-distinction, and ⊢ Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ lbisim (Pθ) (Qθ). By the invertibility of defR
on lbisim and the right-introduction rules for ∀, ∇, ⊃ and ∧, we can infer that
provability of the above formula implies provability of six other formulas, three of
which are given in the following (the other three are symmetric variants of these
formulas):
(a) Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ ∀P ′∀A.Pθ
A
−−→ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′.Qθ
A
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim P ′ Q′
(b) Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ ∀M∀X.Pθ
↓X
−−⇀M ⊃ ∃N.Qθ
↓X
−−⇀N ∧ ∀w.lbisim (Mw) (Nw)
(c) Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ ∀M∀X.Pθ
↑X
−−⇀M ⊃ ∃N.Qθ
↑X
−−⇀N ∧ ∇w.lbisim (Mw) (Nw)
Using provability of these formulas, we show that S is closed under free actions,
bound input actions and bound output actions.
—Suppose Pθ
α
−−→ R where α is a free action. By Lemma 45, we have that
⊢ Qx¯.Pθ
α
−−→ R. (4)
From formula (a) and Lemma 42, we have that
⊢ Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ Pθ
α
−−→ R ⊃ ∃Q′.Qθ
α
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim R Q′. (5)
Applying Lemma 43 to formula (4) and (5) above, we have that
⊢ Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ ∃Q′.Qθ
α
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim R Q′.
The latter implies, by the invertibility of the right rules for ∇ and ∀, provability
of the sequent
Σ ; D1 − m¯ ⊲ ∃Q
′.Q′
α′
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim R′ Q′
where Σ are the eigenvariables corresponding to the universally quantified vari-
ables in Qx¯ (with appropriate raising) and m¯ corresponds to the ∇-quantified
variables in the same prefix. The terms Q′, R′, D1 and α
′ are obtained from,
respectively, Qθ, R, [D′θ] and α by replacing their free names with their raised
counterparts. Note that since θ respects D′, the inequality in D1 are those that
relate distinct terms, hence, by Lemma 41, provability of the above sequent im-
plies the existence of a term T such that ⊢ Σ ; D1 − m¯ ⊲ Q
′
α′
−−→ T ′ and
⊢ Σ ; D1 − m¯ ⊲ lbisim R
′ T ′. (6)
It can be shown by induction on the height of derivations that D1 in the first
sequent can be removed, hence we have that
⊢ Σ ; . − m¯ ⊲ Q′
α′
−−→ T ′.
Applying the appropriate introduction rules to this sequent (top down), we “un-
raise” the variables in Σ and obtain ⊢ Qx¯.Qθ
α
−−→ T, where T corresponds to T ′.
By Lemma 45, this means that Qθ
α
−−→ T. It remains to show that (R, Q) ∈ S.
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This is obtained from the sequent (6) above as follows. We apply the introduction
rules for quantifiers and implication (top down) to sequent (6), hence unraising
the variables in Σ and obtain the provable formula Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ lbisim R T, from
which it follows that (R, T) ∈ SDθ.
—Suppose Pθ
a(y)
−−→ R. As in the previous case, using Lemma 45, Lemma 42,
Lemma 43 and formula (b) we can show that
⊢ Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ ∃Q′.Qθ
↓ a
−−⇀N ∧ ∀w.lbisim (R[w/y]) (N y).
From this formula, we can show that there exists T such that Qx¯.Qθ
↓ a
−−⇀ λz.T,
therefore Qθ
a(z)
−−→ T, and that
⊢ Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ ∀w.lbisim (R[w/y]) (T[w/z]). (7)
We need to show that for a fresh name w, (R[w/y], T[w/z]) ∈ SDθ. From prov-
ability of formula (7), and the fact that (A ⊃ ∀x.B) ⊃ ∀x(A ⊃ B), we obtain
⊢ Qx¯∀w.[D′θ] ⊃ lbisim (R[w/y]) (T[w/z]).
Since the Qx¯∀w-distinction is the same as Qx¯-distinction, the overal distinc-
tion encoded in the above formula is Dθ, therefore, by definition of S, we have
(R[w/y], T[w/z]) ∈ SDθ.
—Suppose Pθ
a¯(y)
−−→ R. This case is similar to the bound input case. Applying the
same arguments shows that there exists a process T such that Qθ
a(z)
−−→ T and
⊢ Qx¯.[D′θ] ⊃ ∇w.lbisim (R[w/y]) (T[w/z]). (8)
We have to show that, for a fresh w, (R[w/y], T[w/z]) ∈ SD2 where D2 = Dθ ∪
{w} × fn(Dθ, Pθ, Qθ). Note that the free names of Dθ, Pθ and Qθ are all in x¯ by
definition. From formula (8) and Lemma 44, we have that
⊢ Qx¯∇w.[D′θ] ⊃ lbisim (R[w/y]) (T[w/z]).
Notice that the Qx¯∇w-distinction is D′′θ ∪ {w} × {x¯}, and since x¯ is the free
names of Dθ, Pθ and Qθ, the overall distinction encoded by the above formula is
exactly D2, hence (R[w/y], T[w/z]) ∈ SD2 as required.
The proof of Theorem 21 is analogous to the completeness proof for Theorem 15.
Suppose P and Q are open D-bisimilar. We construct a derivation of the formula
∀n1 · · · ∀nk([D] ⊃ lbisim P Q) (9)
by induction on the number of action prefixes in P and Q. By applying the intro-
duction rules for ∀, ⊃ and unfolding the definition of lbisim (bottom up) to the
formula (9), we get the following sequents:
(1) n1, · · · , nk, A, P
′ ; [D], P
A
−−→ P ′ − ∃Q′.Q
A
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim P ′ Q′
(2) n1, · · · , nk, X, P
′ ; [D], P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ − ∃Q′.Q
↓X
−−⇀Q′ ∧ ∀w.lbisim (P ′w) (Q′w)
(3) n1, · · · , nk, X, P
′ ; [D], P
↑X
−−⇀ P ′ − ∃Q′.Q
↑X
−−⇀Q′ ∧ ∇w.lbisim (P ′w) (Q′w)
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and their symmetric counterparts. We show here how to construct proofs for these
three sequents; the rest can be proved similarly. In all these three cases, we apply
either the onef rule (for sequent 1) or the oneb rule (for sequent 2 and 3). If
this application of onef (or oneb) results in two distinct name-variables, say n1
and n2, in D to be identified, then the sequent is proved by using the assumption
n1 6= n2 in D. Therefore the only interesting cases are when the instantiations of
name-variables n1, · · · , nk respect the distinction D. In the following we assume the
names n1, . . . , nk are instantiated to m1, . . . ,ml and the distinction D is respected.
Note that l may be smaller than k, depending on D, i.e., it may allow some names
to be identified.
Sequent 1. In this case, after applying the onef rule bottom up and discharging
the trivial premises (i.e., those that violates the distinction D), we need to prove,
for each θ associated with the rule, the sequent
m1, · · · ,ml,Σ ; [Dθ] − ∃Q
′.Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Q′ ∧ lbisim (P ′θ) Q′ (10)
for some signature Σ. By Lemma 34, we know that m1, · · · ,ml,Σ ; . − Pθ
Aθ
−−→
P ′θ is provable. Since m1, . . . ,ml are the only free names in Pθ, we can show by
induction on proofs that Σ in the sequent is redundant and can be removed, thus
the sequent m1, · · · ,ml ; . − Pθ
Aθ
−−→ P ′θ is also provable. By the adequacy of
one-step transition (Proposition 8) and Proposition 4, we have Pθ
α
−−→ R for some
free action α and R where α = Aθ and P ′θ = R. Let θ′ be θ with domain restricted
to {n1, . . . , nk}. Obviously, θ
′ respects D and Dθ′ = Dθ. Since P and Q are open
D-bisimilar, we have that there exists T such that Qθ
α
−−→ T and R ∼Dθ
′
o T, hence
by induction hypothesis, we have that
⊢ ∀m1 · · · ∀ml.[Dθ] ⊃ lbisim P
′θ T. (11)
Provability of sequent (10) follows from these facts, by instantiating Q′ with T.
Sequent 2.. In this case, we need to prove the sequent
m1, · · · ,ml,Σ ; [Dθ] − ∃Q
′.Qθ
↓Xθ
−−⇀Q′ ∧ ∀w.lbisim ((P ′θ)w) (Q′w) (12)
for each non-trivial θ in the premises of oneb rule. By the same reasoning as in the
previous case, we obtain, for every transition Pθ
x(w)
−−→ R, where R = (P ′θ)w, another
transition Qθ
x(w)
−−→ T such that (we assume w.l.o.g. that w is fresh) R ∼Dθo T. The
former implies that Qθ
↓ x
−−→ λw.T is derivable, and the latter implies, by induction
hypothesis, that
∀m1 · · · ∀ml∀w.[Dθ] ⊃ lbisim R T
is derivable. As in the previous case, from these two facts, we can prove the sequent
(12) by instantiating Q′ with λw.T.
Sequent 3. In this case, we need to prove the sequent
m1, · · · ,ml,Σ ; [Dθ] − ∃Q
′.Qθ
Aθ
−−→ Q′ ∧ ∇w.lbisim ((P ′θ)w) (Q′w) (13)
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for each non-trivial θ in the premises of oneb rule. As in the previous case, we
obtain R and T such that Pθ
x¯(w)
−−→ R and Qθ
x¯(w)
−−→ T where λw.R = P ′θ. We assume,
without loss of generality, that w is fresh, therefore since P ∼Do Q, by definition we
have that R ∼D
′
o T, where D
′ = Dθ∪{x}× fn(Dθ, Pθ, Qθ). Note that the free names
of Dθ, Pθ and Qθ are exactly m1, . . . ,ml, so D
′ = Dθ ∪ {x} × {m1, . . .ml}. Thus
by induction hypothesis, the formula
∀m1 · · · ∀ml∀w.[D
′] ⊃ lbisim R T.
Now apply Proposition 3 to replace ∀w with ∇w,
∀m1 · · · ∀mk∇w.[D
′] ⊃ lbisim R T.
And since ∇ distributes over all propositional connectives, we also have
∀m1 · · · ∀mk.(∇w.[D
′]) ⊃ ∇w.lbisim R T.
It can be shown that m1, . . . ,ml ; . − ∇w.[D
′] ⊃ [Dθ] is provable, since the in-
equalities between w and m1, . . . ,mk trivially true. Therefore we have that
⊢ ∀m1 · · · ∀mk.[Dθ] ⊃ ∇w.lbisim R T. (14)
Now in order to prove sequent (13), we instantiate Q′ with λw.T, and the rest of
the proof proceeds as in the previous case, i.e., with the help of formula (14).
B.6 “Early” open bisimulation
The proof of Theorem 23 is by induction on the number of input prefixes in P and
Q. We prove a more general result: ⊢ Qn¯.lbisim P Q if and only if ⊢ Qn¯.ebisim P Q,
for any quantifier prefix Qn¯. By Lemma 37 and Lemma 38, and the invertibility of
∇R and ∀R rules, we know that if ⊢ Qn¯.lbisim P Q and ⊢ Qn¯.ebisim P Q, then their
unfolded instances are also provable. We show that one can construct a derivation
for one instance from the other. The non-trivial case is when the bound input
transition is involved. That is, given a derivation of
Qn¯.[∀X∀P ′.P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∀w∃Q′.Q
↓X
−−⇀Q′ ∧ ebisim (P ′w) Q′w)]
we can construct a derivation of
Qn¯.[∀X∀P ′.P
↓X
−−⇀ P ′ ⊃ ∃Q′.Q
↓X
−−⇀Q′ ∧ ∀w.ebisim (P ′w) (Q′w)]
and vice versa. Note that we cannot do any analysis on the universally quantified
name w in both formulas, since we do not have any assumptions on names (e.g.,
the excluded middle on names as in the adequacy theorem for late bisimulation).
It is then easy to check that the choice of Q′ in both cases is independent of the
name w, and their correspondence follows straightforwardly from the induction
hypothesis.
C. ADEQUACY OF THE SPECIFICATIONS OF MODAL LOGICS
The completeness proof of the modal logics specification shares similar structures
with the completeness proofs for specifications of bisimulation. In particular, we
use an analog of Lemma 39, given in the following.
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Lemma 46. Let P be a process and A an assertion such that P |= A. Then
⊢ ∀n1 · · · ∀nk.X ∧ n1 6= · · · 6= nk ⊃ [[P |= A]]
for some X ⊆f E and some names n1, . . . , nk such that fn(P, A) ⊆ {n1, . . . , nk}.
The proof of lemma proceeds by induction on the size of A. The crucial step
is when its interpretation in FOλ∆∇ contains universal quantification over names,
e.g., when A = [a(y)]B. In this case, we again use the same technique as in the proof
of Lemma 39, i.e., using the excluded middle assumptions on names to enumerate
all possible instances of the judgments. A more detailed proof can be found in the
electronic appendix of this paper.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 25 (Adequacy of the modal logic encoding)
First consider proving the soundness part of this theorem. Suppose we have a
derivation Π of · ; X − ∇n¯.[[P |= A]].We want to show that P |= A. This is proved by
induction on the size of A. The proof also uses the property of invertible rules and
the fact that applications of the excluded middles in X in deriving the sequent can
be permuted up over all the right introduction rules. The latter is a consequence
of Lemma 36. We look at a couple of interesting cases involving bound input and
bound output.
out:. Suppose A is [x¯(y)]B. We need to show that for every P′ such that P
x¯(y)
−−→ P′,
we have P′ |= B. (By α-conversion we can assume without loss of generality that
y is not free in P and A.) Note that here the occurrence of y in P′ is bound in
the transition judgment P
x¯(y)
−−→ P′. By Lemma 36 and the invertibility of certain
inference rules, we can show that provability of · ; X − ∇n¯.[[P |= A]] implies the
existence of a derivation Π′ of
M ; X , n¯ ⊲ [[P]]
↑ x
−−⇀Mn¯ − n¯ ⊲∇y.Mn¯y |= [[B]]
for some eigenvariable M . By the adequacy of one-step transitions, we have that
⊢ ∇n¯.[[P]]
↑ x
−−⇀ λy.[[P′]]. Let θ be the substitution [(λn¯λy.[[P′]])/M ]. Applying θ to
Π′ we get the derivation Π′θ of · ; n¯ ⊲ [[P]]
↑x
−−⇀ λy.[[P′]] − n¯ ⊲∇y.P′ |= [[B]]. By cutting
this derivation with the one-step transition judgment above, we obtain a derivation
of · ; . − n¯ ⊲∇y.P′ |= [[B]]. Hence by induction hypothesis, we have that P′ |= B.
in:. Suppose A is [x(y)]LB. We show that there exists a process P′ such that
P
x(y)
−−→ P′ and for all name w, P′[w/y] |= B[w/y]. It is enough to consider the case
where w is a name in fn(P, A) and the case where w is a new name not in fn(P, A). By
Lemma 36 and the invertibility of some inference rules, we can show that provability
of · ; X − n¯ ⊲ [[P]] |= [[[x(y)]LB]] implies the existence of two derivations Π1 and Π2,
of the sequents · ; X − n¯ ⊲ P
↓ x
−−⇀ N and · ; X − n¯ ⊲ ∀y.Ny |= [[B]], respectively, for
some closed term N .
By the adequacy result in Proposition 8, there exists a process P′ such that
[[P′]] = Ny and P
x(y)
−−→ P′. By Proposition 5, we can instantiate y with any of the
free names occurring in P or A (since they are all in the list n¯), and hence for any
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name w ∈ fn(P, A) by induction hypothesis we get P′[w/y] |= B[w/z]. The case
where w is a new name is dealt with as follows. Without loss of generality we
assume that y = w (since we can always choose y to be sufficiently fresh). From
Π2 it follows that ⊢ X ⊃ ∇n¯.∀y.[[P
′]] |= [[B]]. Using the FOλ∆∇ theorems
(∇x∀y.P ) ⊃ ∀y∇x.P and (P ⊃ ∀z.Q) ⊃ ∀z(P ⊃ Q)
where z is not free in P , we can move the ∀y quantification in X ⊃ ∇n¯.∀y.[[P′]] |= [[B]]
to the outermost level and get the provable formula ∀y(X ⊃ ∇n¯.[[P′]] |= [[B]]). We
then apply Proposition 3, to turn ∀y into∇y, thus obtaining a derivation of∇y(X ⊃
∇n¯.[[P′]] |= [[B]]), and by distributing ∇ over ⊃, we get (∇y.X ) ⊃ ∇y∇n¯.[[P′]] |= [[B]].
We can now apply the induction hypothesis to get P′ |= B.
Next we consider proving the completeness part of Theorem 25. Given P |= A,
we would like to show that · ; X − ∇n¯.[[P |= A]] is provable. By Lemma 46, there
are m1, . . . ,mk and X
′ such that
⊢ ∀m1 · · · ∀mk.X
′ ∧m1 6= m2 · · · 6= mk ⊃ [[P |= A]].
Let n¯ = m1, . . . ,mk and let X = ∇n¯.X
′. By Proposition 3, we have a derivation of
∇m1 · · · ∇mk.X
′ ∧m1 6= m2 · · · 6= mk ⊃ [[P |= A]].
By distributing the ∇’s over implication and conjunction we obtain
X ∧ (∇n¯.m1 6= m2 · · · 6= mk) ⊃ ∇n¯.[[P |= A]].
But since ∇n¯.m1 6= m2 · · · 6= mk is provable, by cut we obtain a derivation of
; X − ∇n¯.[[P |= A]].
D. CHARACTERISATION OF OPEN BISIMULATION
Lemma 47. Let P and Q be two processes. If for all A ∈ LM, ⊢ (Qn¯.P |= A) if
and only if ⊢ (Qn¯.Q |= A), where fn(P, Q, A) ⊆ {n¯}, then P ∼Do Q, where D is the
Qn¯-distinction.
Proof. Let S be the following family of relations
SD = {(P, Q) | for all A, ⊢ (Qn¯.P |= A) iff ⊢ (Qn¯.Q |= A),
where fn(P, Q, A) ⊆ {n¯} and D is the Qn¯-distinction}
We then show that S is an open bisimulation. S is obviously symmetric, so it
remains to show that it is closed under one-step transitions. We show here a case
involving bound output; the rest are treated analogously.
Suppose (P, Q) ∈ SD. Then we have that for all A, ⊢ Qn¯.P |= A iff ⊢ Qn¯.Q |= A, for
some prefix Qn¯. Let θ be a substitution that respects D. Suppose Pθ
x¯(y)
−−→ P′. We
need to show that there exists a Q′ such that Qθ
x¯(y)
−−→ Q′ and P′ ∼D
′
o Q
′ where
D′ = Dθ ∪ {y} × fn(P, Q, D). (Here we assume w.l.o.g. that y is chosen to be
sufficiently fresh.) Suppose θ identifies the following pairs of names in P and Q:
(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), and suppose that θ(z) = x. Then by the definition of SD:
⊢ Qn¯.P |= [x1 = y2][x2 = y2] · · · [xk = yk]〈z¯(y)〉B
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if and only if for all B,
⊢ Qn¯.Q |= [x1 = y2][x2 = y2] · · · [xk = yk]〈z¯(y)〉B.
Note that the statement cannot hold vacuously, since for at least one instance
of B, i.e., B = true, both judgments must be true. By analysis on the (supposed)
cut-free proofs of both judgments, for any B, the above statement reduces to
⊢ Qm¯.Pθ |= 〈x¯(y)〉Bθ iff ⊢ Qm¯.Qθ |= 〈x¯(y)〉Bθ,
for some prefix Qm¯ such that Qm¯-distinction is the result of applying θ to the
Qn¯-distinction.
Now let {Qi}i∈I be the set of all Q
′ such that Qθ
x¯(y)
−−→ Q′, and suppose that for all
i ∈ I, P′ 6∼D
′
o Qi. That means that there exists an Ai, for each i ∈ I, that separates
P′ and Qi, i.e., ⊢ (Qm¯∇y.P
′ |= Ai) but 6⊢ (Qm¯∇y.Q
′ |= Ai). Note that we can assume
w.l.o.g. that m¯ include all the free names of Ai (recall that n¯ is really a schematic
list of names, dependent on the choice of A in the first place). Let Bθ be
∧
i∈I Ai.
Then, by analysis of cut-free proofs, we can show that ⊢ (Qm¯.Pθ |= 〈x¯(y)〉Bθ) but
6⊢ (Qm¯.Q |= 〈x¯(y)〉Bθ), which contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore, there
must be one Q′ such that Q
x¯(y)
−−→ Q′ and P′ ∼D
′
o Q
′.
Lemma 48. Let P and Q be two processes such that P ∼Do Q for some distinction
D. Then for all A ∈ LM and for all prefix Qn¯ such that D corresponds to the
Qn¯-distinction and fn(P, Q, D) ⊆ {n¯}, ⊢ Qn¯.P |= A if and only if ⊢ Qn¯.Q |= A.
Proof. Suppose that P ∼Do Q and ⊢ Qn¯.P |= A. We show, by induction on the
size of A, that ⊢ Qn¯.Q |= A. The other direction is proved symmetrically, since open
bisimulation is symmetric. We look at the interesting cases.
—Suppose A = 〈x¯(y)〉B for some B. By analysis on the cut free derivations of
Qn¯.P |= A, it can be shown that
⊢ Qn¯.∃M.P
↑x
−−⇀M ∧ ∇y.(M y) |= B.
This entails that there exists a process P′ such that
⊢ Qn¯.P
↑x
−−⇀ λy.P′ ∧∇y.P′ |= B.
And by the invertibility of the right-introduction rules for ∀, ∇ and ∧, this in turn
entails that ⊢ Qn¯.P
↑x
−−⇀ λy.P′ and ⊢ Qn¯∇y.P′ |= B. The former implies, by the
adequacy of one-step transition, that P
x¯(y)
−−→ P′. Since P ∼Do Q, this means that
there exists Q′ such that Q
x¯(y)
−−→ Q′ and P′ ∼D
′
o Q
′, whereD′ = D∪{y}×fn(P, Q, D).
At this point we are almost ready to apply the induction hypothesis toQn¯∇y.P′ |=
B, except that D′ may not corresponds to the Qn¯∇y-distinction, since the latter
may contain more inequal pairs than D′. However, since open bisimulation is
closed under extensions of distinctions (see Lemma 6.3. in [Sangiorgi 1996]), we
can assume without loss of generality that D′ is indeed the Qn¯∇y-distinction.
Therefore by the adequacy of one-step transition and induction hypothesis, we
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conclude that ⊢ Qn¯.Q
↑x
−−⇀ λx.Q′ and ⊢ Qn¯∇y.Q′ |= B, and from these, it follows
that Qn¯.P |= A is also provable.
—Suppose A = 〈x(y)〉B. This case is analogous to the previous case. The only differ-
ence is that the bound input is universally quantified, instead of ∇-quantified. So
we apply the induction hypothesis to Qn¯∀y.P′ |= B, which can be done without re-
sorting to extensions of the distinction D, since in this case the Qn¯∀y-distinction
is exactly D.
—For the cases where A is prefixed by either [x(y)]L or [x¯(y)], the proof follows a
similar argument as in the completeness proof of open bisimulation (Theorem 21).
For instance, for the case where A = [x(y)]LB, from the fact that ⊢ Qn¯.P |= A, it
follows that
⊢ Qn¯.∀M(P
↓x
−−⇀M ⊃ ∃y.(M y) |= B).
As in the proof of Theorem 21, we can further show that there is a derivation
of this formula that ends with oneb-rule, such that every θ in this premise is a
D-respecting substitution. Since P ∼Do Q, we can show that every bound input
action of Pθ, for any D-respecting θ, can be imitated by Qθ and vice versa. From
this and induction hypothesis, we can therefore obtain a derivation of
Qn¯.∀N(Q
↓x
−−⇀N ⊃ ∃y.(N y) |= B),
hence ⊢ Qn¯.Q |= A.
Finally, the proof of Theorem 26 now follows immediately from Lemma 47 and
Lemma 48.
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